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Guarding Beijing's Food 
Security in the Qing Dynasty: 
State, Market, and Police 
LILLIAN M. LI and ALISON DRAY-NOVEY 
AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF BEIJING'S long history as China's imperial capital was 
the ability to feed its population despite a geographical location distinctly unfavorable 
to agriculture. For all ancient and modern states, provisioning the capital is not only 
a matter of pride and prestige but a question of survival. The failure to feed civil 
officials, military supporters, and the urban population that serves them is a visible 
sign of a government's inadequacy and easily leads to political unrest. For these 
Lillian M. Li is Professor of History at Swarthmore College. Alison Dray-Novey is Professor 
of History at the College of Notre Dame of Maryland. 
This article grows out of Lillian M. Li's book manuscript in preparation, Fighting 
Famine in North China: State, Market and Ecological Crisis, 1698-1998, which focuses 
on the natural, economic, and political contexts for food supply and food crises in the 
Zhili-Hebei region. Susan Naquin, Princeton University, whose book on Beijing will 
soon be published, has a vast knowledge about Beijing's history; she has generously 
shared many sources and insights with us. We also thank James Lee, California 
Institute of Technology for providing some key references, and Helen Dunstan, 
University of Sydney, for sharing unpublished materials. Pierre-Etienne Will, College 
de France, has given us valuable guidance. Mark Elliott, University of California at 
Santa Barbara, has provided a key reference. Han Guanghui of Beijing University has 
shared his rich knowledge of the population history of Beijing. Ke Yan, a recent Ph.D. 
recipient from the Department of History, Georgetown University, Huang Jia-wan, 
and Liman Lievens, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University, have contributed research 
assistance. Librarians Timothy Connor and Mi Chu Wiens have helped us obtain 
materials. Joelle G. Novey provided technical assistance for the map. This article was 
written with research support from the College of Notre Dame of Maryland, 
Swarthmore College, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
Earlier versions were presented by Lillian M. Li at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, The Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University, George 
Washington University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Swarthmore College; she 
is grateful for the comments from these seminars. 
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reasons, all states have tended to favor the food security of their cities, and especially 
their capital cities. In this China has no claim to uniqueness. 
The remarkable aspect of the Chinese record is rather the success with which food 
security for an extraordinarily populous capital was maintained over so many centuries. 
The achievement of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) in maintaining Beijing's food 
supply, at least in the eighteenth century, stands in sharp contrast to the fate of then-
contemporary Paris, where grain prices became the most visible focus of political 
contention. Parisians habitually convinced themselves that every food crisis was the 
result of a government plot. As Steven Kaplan has written: 
The famine plot persuasion received its most striking expression in the Revolution . 
. . . But like many attitudes and practices associated with the Revolution, the famine 
plot persuasion was a way of making sense of the world that was deeply rooted in 
the collective consciousness and the material, moral, and political environment of the 
old regime. During each of the major subsistence crises of the eighteenth century, a 
considerable number of Frenchmen believed that they were victims of a terrible 
conspiracy. 
(Kaplan 1982, 1-2) 
As if they had known about the plight of Paris under the Bourbon kings, but in 
fact following long-established Chinese practice, the Qing emperors and their officials 
planned assiduously to protect Beijing from any popular unrest. It was not simply 
that they were heirs to the Confucian/Mencian ideological claim that the failure of 
the ruler to prevent famine was just cause for rebellion-although this was a 
compelling political legacy. It was not simply that Beijing had its own grain supply 
from the south-although this supply was immense, and the Grand Canal that 
transported it was one of the wonders of Chinese civilization. Nor was it only that-
and this is less well known than the preceding circumstances-regional and local 
sources of grain complemented the grain tribute and helped to support the capital 
region as a whole. In addition, the Qing state controlled and policed the storage and 
distribution of grain with regulations that were strict and even coercive, and yet at 
the same time reflected a subtle understanding of market mechanisms. 
In controlling Beijing's food supply, the state's objective was not only to feed the 
rulers; it sought to provision the entire population in order to preserve the security 
of the capital. To this end, the direct economic interests of the bannermen, an 
important part of the ruling elite, were critical but secondary to the long-term 
political interests of the dynasty itself. Reduced-price sales of grain and soup kitchens 
were not only or even primarily acts of charity, but rather measures to preserve social, 
and hence political, stability. There was supposed to be no subsistence-related reason 
for the residents of Beijing to find fault with the government. Until the end of the 
eighteenth century, these expectations were largely fulfilled; even in the more troubled 
and less prosperous nineteenth century, food never became the focus of political action 
in Beijing. The food riot, an important part of the popular repertoire in Paris and 
elsewhere, was virtually unknown in Beijing. The strengths of the Chinese capital's 
food security system, advanced by world standards in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, were considerable even in decline. 
The Qing emperors did not sacrifice the interests of the rest of China to enrich 
the capital. Indeed, especially during the eighteenth century, the "high Qing," they 
actively promoted agricultural development and population resettlement throughout 
the empire, retained an impressive state granary system, engaged in river control, and 
effectively dispensed famine relief (Ho 1959, Perdue 1987, Will and Wong 1991, 
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Will 1990, Rawski and Li 1992). The role of the state was paramount, but almost 
from the beginning of the eighteenth century, statesmen-theorists expressed serious 
reservations about the extent to which the state should intervene in the market 
(Dunstan 1996, Dunstan forthcoming, Rowe 1993, Will 1999, Wong 1997). Beijing, 
however, was exceptional because of its incomparable strategic importance. The need 
for direct and sometimes forceful intervention in the market there was less often 
questioned. Resilient flexibility and multiplicity of bureaucratic means and agencies 
were characteristic of the Qing rule of Beijing. In food security the state had a variety 
of measures at its disposal: direct control of supply, indirect controls over marketing, 
reduced-price sales, policing of supplies, and direct relief. Over the course of the Qing 
period, increasing pressure on food security because of population growth and 
declining resources led in Beijing to a greater reliance on policing and direct relief 
than on provisioning and controlling the market-another tendency not found in the 
rest of the empire. 
Beijing in the Qing Period 
Beijing was only partly a creation of the Manchus; the magnificent physical plan 
of the city, based on nested walled areas, had been inherited from the early Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644). The innermost core was the Forbidden City (Zijin cheng), 
which housed the emperor and court. Surrounding it was the Imperial City (Huang 
cheng), which contained the palaces of the imperial clan, government offices, and 
residences of high officials. Outside the Imperial City was the extensive remainder of 
the Inner City (Nei cheng), where the banner forces, the main military support of the 
dynasty, and their families lived. 
The banners were a form of social and military organization. Before the conquest 
of China that had been completed in 1644, eight Mongol and eight Chinese (hanjun) 
banners had been added to the original Manchu eight, resulting in a total of twenty-
four military units. Residential areas in the Inner City were assigned according to 
banner, but men of different banners served together in various military divisions in 
the capital. One of these was the Bujun ying (banner gendarmerie) of about 23,000 
men that along with the nonbanner Chinese police (Wu ying) of about 10,000 men 
conducted many activities related to food security in both Inner and Outer Cities. 
The Wu ying (Five Battalions) belonged to the Chinese Army of the Green Standard 
(Lil ying) but served with the banner gendarmerie under a common head. During the 
Qing, the Inner City was dominated by the Manchu conquerors and their Mongol 
and Chinese adherents. It was because Manchus and Mongols were so numerous in 
the Inner City that it was called the "Tartar City" by Westerners. Outside the front 
three gates of the Inner City on the south lay the Outer City (Wai cheng), where 
most of the nonbanner Chinese population lived (Dray-Novey 1993, 890-91). 
Governance of Beijing was carried on by several overlapping and sometimes 
competing jurisdictions. In the eyes of the rulers, the potential for administrative 
confusion in this arrangement was outweighed by the benefits of having several offices 
watch not only the same territory but also each other's performance. The Court and 
Imperial City were managed mainly by the Imperial Household Department (Neiwu 
fu) and units (other than the gendarmerie) of the metropolitan divisions of the banners. 
The rest of the Inner City was policed by the above-mentioned joint banner and 
Chinese force under the Captain-General of Gendarmerie (Bujun tongling). In 
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Table 1. Population of Beijing and Suburbs in the Qing Period 
Location 1647 1781 1882 1909 
Inner City 395,000 541,000 479,400 468,970* 
Outer City 144,000 235,142 296,711 316,472* 
Chengshu Suburb 120,000 210,736 309,044 343,366 
TOTAL 659,000 986,878 1,085,155 1,128,808 
Source: Han 19966, 128. 
*Han's total for the Inner and Outer Cities in 1909 (785,442) closely matches Beijing police 
census data showing the same figure as rising from 727,863 in 1913 to 811,556 in 1917 
(Gamble and Burgess 1921, 412-13). 
addition, the Inner and Outer Cities as well as suburbs just outside their thirteen 
external gates also were specially administered by the Censorate in Five Districts (Wu 
cheng). Censors and police attached to the Five Districts focused on the nonbanner 
population and therefore on the Outer City and on suburbs around the capital. (While 
the term "Wu cheng" referring to the entire capital went back to the Ming period, 
in the Qing dynasty the same term also was used to refer to five sections of the Outer 
City. Only context reveals which definition is intended in particular references during 
the Qing.) With Beijing's territory divided yet another way, however, the Inner and 
Outer Cities formed part of the two xian (counties) of Daxing and Wanping, in the 
Shuntian prefecture of Zhili province. Although the prefecture connected Beijing to 
the empire's civil administrative hierarchy, matters relating to the capital were not 
included in the Zhili governor-general's or the Shuntian prefect's reports. 1 Because of 
Beijing's political centrality, the authorities treated the city as unique, as sui generis. 
Qing-era Beijing in its time was one of the world's most populous cities. The 
greatest differences from the Ming period were the forcible introduction of the 
Manchus among the Han Chinese and the high proportion of bannermen and their 
families in the overall population of the capital. In extensive recent studies based on 
Qing household registration data and other primary evidence, Han Guanghui 
concludes that gradual growth in the number of inhabitants in the walled cities and 
their immediate extramural suburbs (chengshu) raised Beijing's total population from 
about 660,000 at the beginning of the Qing dynasty to well over a million at its end. 
Specifically, Han estimates the Beijing population of 1647 at 659,000 (395,000 
in the Inner City; 144,000 in the Outer City; and 120,000 in the chengshu areas; see 
Table 1). By 1781, however, these figures had increased to 541,000 in the Inner City; 
235,142 in the Outer City; and 210,736 in the chengshu. Thus the total city population 
in 1781 was 986,878. A century later in 1882 total population exceeded one million, 
although the Inner City figure had declined (479,400 in the Inner City; 296,711 in 
the Outer City; and 309,044 in the chengshu; total 1,085,155). Finally, at the end of 
the Qing period in 1909, Inner City population had declined even further but the 
metropolitan total continued to increase (468,970 in the Inner City; 316,472 in the 
Outer City; 343,366 in the chengshu; total 1,128,808) (Han 19966, 128). For almost 
all of the dynasty the banner (Manchu, Mongol, and hanjun) population, including 
families, constituted more than 60 percent of the people of Beijing, defined as the 
'In the monthly report of grain prices for Zhili province, for example, Shuntian prefecture 
prices regularly exclude Daxing and Wanping counties. 
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Table 2. Banner and Han Population of Beijing, 1882 
Location Banner Han 
Inner City 444,400 35,000 
Outer City 11,900* (284,811) 
Chengshu Suburb 225,644 83,400 
TOTAL 681,944 403,211 
Source: Han 19966, 114, 118, 120, 126, 128 (Tables 3-17, 18, 20, 21, 22). 






**Banner population was about 63 percent of the total. For the region, however, the banner 
percentage represented a much smaller proportion, about 28 percent, because almost no 
bannermen lived beyond the suburbs (Han 19966, 302). For 1882-83, Han (Table 3-17, 118) 
shows a population of 1,364,397 living in the eighteen zhou and xian beyond the suburbs but 
within the Beijing region, forming a grand total of 2,449,552 (1,085,155 plus 1,364,397), 
but this regional population was entirely Han Chinese. 
two walled cities and their immediate suburbs, but a much smaller percentage if the 
larger metropolitan region is considered. Although concentrated in the Inner City 
and found in small numbers in the Outer City, bannermen also increasingly resided 
in the nearby chengshu (Han 19966, 126, 129; see Table 2). 
While Han's figures are in accord with previous estimates for the Inner City 
(including the drop in population there in the later Qing period, when the government 
became poorer), they are generally somewhat lower for the Outer City (Dray-Novey 
1993, 889). One reason for this discrepancy may be that the Outer City in all periods 
contained far more transient visitors and a greater "floating population" than were 
found in the more strictly controlled Inner City. Therefore, it normally may have held 
many people who were missed in the official enumerations upon which Han relies. 
Han's inclusion of the population of the closest suburbs in the overall Beijing 
figures points to another reason for discrepancies with past estimates and among those 
estimates themselves: the area for which population was being measured was not 
always the same. Early Qing foreign visitors who guessed that Beijing's population 
was two to three million probably did not confine themselves to the area within the 
gates of the two walled cities. For example, Father Ripa reported in the early 
eighteenth century that there was a large suburb outside every gate, with those on 
the west side of the Inner City especially populous (Ripa 1846, 47). Nineteenth-
century travel accounts, however, suggest an abrupt transition between city and 
country along the city walls on the north (Ellis 1818, 140; Kovalevsky 1853, 1:141) 
and south (Kovalevsky 1853, 11:47-48; Fortune 1863, 366-69). The increasing 
population that Han shows in the suburban areas may have distributed itself 
differently over time. The presence of at least some populous suburbs just outside the 
city gates is important because certain governmental restrictions (such as regulation 
of merchants' grain supplies) were enforced only inside the walls of the Inner and 
Outer Cities. Beijing's food security must be considered with reference to the two 
walled cities, their immediate suburbs, and the surrounding region. 
Beijing's Food Supply and the Grain 
Tribute System 
Located in the unstable, drought- and flood-prone agricultural environment of 
north China, Beijing was largely, but not completely, dependent on grain tribute 
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delivered via the Grand Canal from the south. Following the practices and precedents 
of earlier dynasties, the Qing emperors looked to the agriculturally richest provinces 
of the empire to provision the capital. The importance of the grain tribute system 
(caoyun) in Chinese imperial history and the immense quantity of its supplies during 
the Ming and Qing periods are well known. Yet the variety of grains available and 
the range of instruments by which the court and bureaucracy manipulated them to 
maintain the food security and stability of the entire metropolitan region have not 
received the attention they deserve. 
The grain tribute system originated in the sixth and seventh centuries when the 
Sui dynasty (A.D. 581-617) built the first Grand Canal linking the lower Yangzi 
valley to its capital at Chang'an near the Yellow River. In the thirteenth century, 
when the Mongols placed their capital at Beijing (which they called Khanbaliq), the 
canal was extended in its second or modern form to reach near the city. In the Ming 
and Qing periods, the grain tribute achieved a scale much larger than that of the Sui 
and Tang. The mature grain tribute system allowed the Manchu conquerors to enjoy 
the products of south and central Chinese agriculture while maintaining their center 
of political power in the north, near the Great Wall and their homeland. 
Grain tribute was a form of tax due from the lower Yangzi and southeastern 
provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi; the central Yangzi provinces of 
Hunan and Hubei; and the northern provinces of Henan and Shandong, adjacent to 
Zhili (Hinton 1956, 7, 9a). Of these, the lower Yangzi and southeastern provinces 
contributed the largest share. 
The broad base from which tribute grain was drawn ensured a constant supply; 
a poor harvest in one region could be offset by agricultural bounty from another. It 
also ensured a diversity of grain types. Although tribute grain consisted fundamentally 
of various grades of rice from the south, Henan and Shandong also had a small quota 
for beans and millet, and, in the late eighteenth century, wheat. The principal 
categories of rice were baimi, gengmi, xianmi, and suomi. Baimi, sometimes also called 
bailiang or bailiangmi, was superior white rice. It was intended for the court's 
consumption and also was given as stipends to imperial princes. 2 Gengmi was ordinary, 
nonglutinous rice, and it constituted the bulk of the rice from Jiang-Zhe (Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang). Apparently, glutinous rice or nuomi sometimes was included with it. 
At times xianmi was allowed to be substituted for gengmi or mixed with it, but xianmi 
was considered inferior. 3 Suomi, never well defined in any source, clearly was considered 
inferior to baimi, gengmi, and xianmi. In fact, it is implied in some references that suomi 
was not even considered a type of paddy rice (daomi).4 Millet or sumi always was 
considered inferior to any grade of rice, but definitely was included in the tribute 
system. 
2The emperor and the court actually ate rice that was produced locally, the excellent rice 
that was grown west of the capital. Thanks to Evelyn Rawski for pointing this out from an 
article by Xu Qixian, "Qingdai huangdi de yongshan," Zijincheng 1980, 4:10. See also E. 
Rawski 1998, 47. 
3 According to Bray, gengmi was japonica rice, which was higher priced, while xianmi was 
indica or Champa rice, associated with early growing types (1984, 490-94). Both types were 
from Zhejiang province. 
4For example: "Tongzhou each year is allowed to store suomi 130,000 shi. In 1739 (QL 4) 
there was insufficient rice (daomi), so it was decided to substitute suomi for daomi 20,000 shi" 
(CYQS 55:186-19). Playfair defines suomi as "upland rice" from the Jiang-Zhe region (1875, 
356). Will misprints the character, but gives the reading suomi and calls it an inferior grade 
of rice (1990, 352). 
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Figure 1. Approximate locations of Beijing granaries and reduced-price (pingtiao) 
stations in the Qing period. 
Notes: (a) The number of capital granaries varied slightly during the Qing period but 
the overall pattern of their placement did not. We have not found information on the 
location of the two northwestern granaries ocher than chat they were "outside the 
Desheng gate" (Li and Jiang 1995, 170) and probably between chat gate and the 
Xizhi gate (JWSL 4:64a-66b). (b) The Nei cang or "inner" granary is not usually 
listed as one of the capital granaries. It was located outside the main gate of the Board 
of Revenue (Hu bu) (HDSL 184:26ab). (c) Pingtiao stations (in 1738) are placed 
roughly with reference to the nearest gate (e.g. "outside Zhengyang Gate"), not in 
precise geographical locations. Mayers et al. ( 1867, opposite 498) show two soup 
kitchens at or near Outer City locations where pingtiao stations had been found in 
1738. (d) After tribute grain reached Beijing from Tongzhou, it was transported either 
by land or by canal. A special canal entered the wall of the Inner City through the 
"Water" Gate (shuimen) between the Chongwen and Zhengyang (Qian) Gates. 
According to Rennie (1865, 1:68-69), the channel existed but was not in use in the 
early 1860s. Other sources: Qing Neiwufu cang Jingcheng quantu (1750); JWSL 7:47ab; 
Bredon 1922, Bichurin map; Hou 1985, 41-42; Han 1996a, 21. 
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Wheat or mai was not formally listed as part of the grain tribute. From the late 
eighteenth century, however, wheat that had previously been shipped from the 
provincial granaries for relief sales but had remained unused was allowed to be 
substituted for millet or inferior rice (sumi or suomi) in stipend grain. Beans, mainly 
black beans, were allotted for horses. In theory, one shi of black beans was allotted 
monthly per horse. 
Not only were there diverse types and sources of grain tribute, but each year the 
timing of their arrival at the capital area was deliberately staggered. Tribute boats-
part of the grain tribute fleet that has been estimated at about ten thousand vessels 
(Bell 1966, 167; Davis 1836, I:380)-arrived from various embarkation points at 
specified times in the year. At the outset ofQing rule in the mid-seventeenth century, 
boats from the south would cross the Huai River annually during the winter in the 
twelfth, first, or second lunar months. They would arrive at Tongzhou-the terminus 
of the Grand Canal-between the third and sixth lunar months. For example, from 
the Jiangnan region, the boats would cross the Huai annually in the first month and 
arrive in Tongzhou in the fifth lunar month (HDSL 102:7a, SZl [1644}). In 1753, 
the regulations were altered to say that henceforth tribute grain might arrive between 
the fourth and eighth months (HDSL 185:4a, QL 18 [1753}). Wheat from Herran 
and Shandong, nearer to the capital, arrived in the third month (oblique reference in 
CYQS 61:22ab, DG 4 [1824}; this passage also appears in HDSL 1139:16b-17a). 
The tribute grain arrived at Tongzhou, about twelve miles from the capital, where 
it either was unloaded and transferred to boats bound by canal for the Beijing 
metropolitan granaries or retained for the Tongzhou granaries. In Qing-period Beijing 
there were, at various times, ten to fourteen granaries with a total of 956 buildings 
(ao). All capital granaries and transfers among them were guarded by gendarmerie-
granaries inside the walls of the Inner City by the Gendarmerie Division and those 
outside by the Five Battalions CTWSL 4:40a-4lb [1826}, 4:47a-49b [1822}, 4:50ab 
[1822}, 4:5 la-52b [1802}, 4:53a-54a [1811}, 4:55a-58b [1851} 7:47ab [nd}, 4:28a-
29a [1809}, 4:45a-46a [1801}; Wade 1851, 305). (See Figure 1.) 
Tongzhou with only two granaries containing 222 buildings had less than one 
quarter the storage capacity of the capital. With an average capacity of 10,000 shi5 
per building, the combined capacity of Beijing and Tongzhou granaries was 
11,780,000 shi in 1,178 buildings. 6 In addition the Bei cang (Northern granary) at 
Tianjin stored tribute grain in transit to or intended for the Zhili provincial granaries. 
The Bei cang had been established in 1724 and had 48 buildings. In the eighteenth 
century, tribute grain that was to be diverted for relief in Zhili was kept at the Bei 
cang (Will 1990, 154; Will and Wong 1991, 118, 133).7 
Robert Fortune, the observant nineteenth-century English botanist and author, 
describes the Bei cang and other government granaries: 
The greater part of the rice used in these districts is brought up in junks from the 
south. Large Imperial granaries have been built in different parts of the country, 
5Shi was a measure of volume of grain. The same character is read dan when used as a 
measure of weight. A shi of milled rice weighed approximately 175-195 pounds (Chuan and 
Kraus 1975, 79-98). 
6HBZL 1874 ed., 18: 1-2. The 1791 ed., 24: front, has the same information with printing 
errors. Both editions report thirteen Beijing granaries. HDSL 1143:15b-16a says there were 
ten; JWSL 7:47ab says fourteen. Li and Jiang (1995, 170) has a table showing names and 
locations of thirteen granaries in Beijing and two in Tongzhou, with a total capacity of 1,206 
buildings. 
7In 1754, however, 28 of 48 buildings at the Bei cang were unfit for use. Tianjin fuzhi 
(1898, 29:24-34) records grain diverted to storage in the Bei cang. 
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where the rice is laid up in store. I visited one of these at a place named Pae-tsang, 
situated on the left bank of the Pei-ho, some six miles from Tien-tsin. It consisted 
of sixteen large buildings or barns, three hundred feet in length, and about forty or 
fifty feet high. . . . At Peking I afterwards saw a number of Imperial granaries built 
upon the same plan, and presenting the same appearance. 
(1863, 339) 
The difference in functions between the Beijing and Tongzhou granaries is 
nowhere, to our knowledge, explicitly stated, and the balance between them seems to 
have changed frequently during the Qing period. The Nei cang in Beijing under the 
overall supervision of the Board of Revenue (Hu bu), had the special function of 
provisioning the Imperial Household Department and certain related agencies within 
the Imperial City (HDSL 184:26a). The other Beijing granaries also functioned under 
the Board of Revenue, but their activities were supervised directly by the Army of 
the Eight Banners (Bagi), which controlled the distribution of banner stipends. The 
Hu bu, however, managed the stocks at Tongzhou that were given out as salary 
stipends to both civilian and military officials, and possibly also to imperial princes. 
The Hu bu also played a role in diverting relief grain to the state civilian granary 
system within Zhili province. The Bei cang at Tianjin was controlled by the governor-
general of Zhili. Although regulations for grain tribute specified the types and 
amounts of grain to be stored in each of the metropolitan granaries,8 actual practice 
allowed for considerable flexibility among the granaries in the allocation and 
distribution of types of grain. 
Because the granaries at Tongzhou could not be as stringently monitored as those 
at the capital, they frequently presented difficulties. Particularly in the 1790s, officials 
repeatedly suggested moving distribution of officials' stipend grain away from 
Tongzhou to the Beijing granaries (HDSL 185:26a, 186:18a, QL 59, JQ 1, JQ 3-
1794, 1796, 1798). Documents stated that formerly the tribute grain shipped to 
Beijing was all stored at Tongzhou, but this was expensive for officials who had to 
travel there from Beijing to get their grain. To facilitate more convenient access to 
grain, adjustments were made in the different mix of kinds of grain to be stored at 
the Beijing and Tongzhou granaries. 9 
The amount of the grain tribute that arrived at its destination changed over time. 
In the Ming period, the target amount was four million shi per year, but in the later 
fifteenth century, it may have reached 5.2 million shi (Wu 1989, 172). Under the 
Qing, the annual quota for the grain tribute was 4,372,614 shi (HCSHZ 5/cangchu 
1). This total probably applies to the early Qing, at least through the first part of the 
Qianlong reign (1730s-50s). In 1753, 2,750,000 shi of grain were received for the 
capital granaries and 500,000 for the Tongzhou granaries, a total of 3.25 million shi 
(Shilu; cited in Wu 1989, 172). Again, in the early nineteenth century, the total 
8HDSL 186 passim lists types of grains, uses, and storage. The original principle was 
"Bailiang is exclusively stored in the Tongzhou granaries. Wheat, black beans, and barley are 
at the Beijing granaries. All the geng, suo, and sumi (san se) are allocated equally among the 
granaries" (HCSHZ 5/cangchu, 1). Bailiang was sent to the Nei cang (in Beijing) as well 
(HDSL 184:26ab, 185:136). 
9Stipends for officials that were Jiang-Zhe baimi would still be stored at Tongzhou, but 
other types of stipendiary rice might go to either Beijing or Tongzhou. Some officials could 
get their grain at Beijing (HDSL 186:8a, 126, 146, 17a). In 1798 (JQ 3), in an attempt to 
simplify the stipend distribution system, it was decided that the Beijing granaries would store 
only gengmi or suomi, while Tongzhou would hold four other categories (CYQS 62:176-186). 
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amount of grain tribute levied was 5.5 million shi, but the amount expected to reach 
the metropolitan granaries was only 3.5 million shi per year. 10 
The quantity of grain stored at Beijing and Tongzhou from the early Qing 
through the eighteenth century was staggering. In 1721, at the end of the Kangxi 
reign, all granaries together held 5 .8 million shi in reserve. There was so much grain 
at the Tongzhou granaries around this time that shipments were diverted or 
temporarily suspended (Will 1990, 284, n. 26). In 1729-30, in the Yongzheng reign, 
13-15 million shi were in storage. Through most of the long Qianlong reign, even 
until the end of the eighteenth century, 6-10 million shi were stored. Even in the 
early nineteenth century, during the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820), reserves of 3-6 
million shi still were maintained. Only in the Daoguang reign (1821-1850) did 
inventories begin to fall to 3 million and under. Following many mid-nineteenth 
century disruptions-the gradual disuse of the Grand Canal due to silting, the use of 
sea transport, the Taiping rebellion, poor harvests in the lower Yangzi region and tax 
resistance-grain tribute storage in the capital area fell precipitously to amounts under 
a million shi in the Xianfeng and Tongzhi periods (1851-1874). Some of the 
metropolitan granaries were reported to be in terrible disrepair in the early nineteenth 
century (Will and Wong 1991, 134). In the late nineteenth century, commercial 
purchases boosted grain stocks once again to over a million, but for all practical 
purposes, grain tribute was a shadow of its former self after mid-century. 11 The decline 
in so central a government function was a significant indicator of dynastic crisis. 
Grain Tribute and the Regional Market 
Had the Beijing food security system been a simple and closed one, there is no 
question that grain tribute received would have been more than sufficient to feed the 
million or more people in Beijing and its environs during most of the Qing period. 
Even in the first half of the nineteenth century, a supply of 3.5 million shi a year 
would have been sufficient to feed the capital population. 12 No other grain supply 
10Hinton (1956, 7; 9a-b) has a table of grain tribute quotas from various provinces for 
1829. 
11Li and Jiang (1995, 54-58) contains a comprehensive table based on registers held at 
the Qing archives. (See also, pp. 405-6 and ch. 9-10 on mid-nineteenth century problems.) 
Commercial purchases in late Qianlong and Jiaqing periods were targeted principally for 
famine relief in Beijing and Zhili (Li and Jiang 1995, 93-99). 
12This would be true using several possible standards of measurement. For example, in 
the eighteenth century the adult ration for famine relief was half a sheng ( = 5 he) or 0.005 shi 
of mi (husked rice or grain) per day (Will 1990, 130-35). Thus each person would require 
1.83 shi per year, and 3.5 million shi could have fed approximately two million adults a year 
at subsistence standards. This is very similar to another subsistence standard: the average per 
capita yearly grain consumption in Beijing in 1979, under the People's Republic of China, 
was 300 jin (Croll 1983, 131), or about 333 lbs (1 Jin = 1.1 lb.), or in Qing terms, 1.9 shi 
(1 shi = 185 lbs). By this low standard, 3.5 million shi could have fed 1.94 million people a 
year. Using a much higher standard, Li and Jiang state that in the Qianlong period, about 4 
million shi arrived in Beijing and Tongzhou each year, and calculate that if each person con-
sumed 0.3 shi of grain per month, or 3.6 shi a year, then the grain tribute would have been 
enough to feed 1.1 million people for a year (1995, 85). Crossley (1990, 52), cites the standard 
of 0.25 shi of grain per individual per month, which amounts to 3 shi per person per year. 
Using that standard, 3.5 million shi would feed slightly fewer than 1.2 million adults a year. 
According to Hinton (1956, 97) 3.5 million shi would be equivalent to 280,000 tons. 
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would have been needed if direct consumption had been the only function of grain 
tribute. 
According to one estimate, in the early Qing, only about 60 percent of the grain 
tribute was used in the payment of stipends for princes, officials, and bannermen 
(fengmi and jiami ). Another 10 percent was needed for wages of government workers 
and artisans (jiangmi), and 1 percent for the Imperial family (enmi) (Li and Jiang 1995, 
5 9 n. l, also 72 citing CYQS, juan 1 7). This would have left 29 percent (more than 
one million shi) for discretionary use. A more conservative estimate concludes that 
about half a million shi remained each year after the stipend grain had been 
distributed. 13 Yet another source states that 2 .4 million shi were distributed as 
stipends to the banners and 350,000-360,000 shi to officials, a total of about 2.75 
million shi per year (CYQS 56; cited in Wu 1989, 170. Also, Li and Jiang 1995, 72, 
83). In fact, the totals given by Li and Jiang (cited above) show such a surfeit of grain 
in the Beijing and Tongzhou granaries that we can feel confident in saying that the 
state had an amount far greater than half a million shi at its disposal. 
Most of the surplus held in reserve formed an important source of relief grain in 
times of crisis, supplementing the stores held in the ever-normal granary system in 
the province of Zhili; moreover, the surplus provided an important source of Zhili's 
stability even in normal times. 14 Grain tribute also was diverted to other regions of 
China, or retained in the province of origin, to meet critical shortages (Will 1990, 
285-87). It was clear, however, that the functions of grain tribute were primarily 
provisioning the court, officials, and bannermen, and secondarily supporting the 
general population of the capital. In 1744, the Qianlong emperor explicitly cautioned 
against the overuse of the practice of diverting grain tribute to other regions: "In fact, 
although the Metropolitan Granaries' stocks are said to be enough for five years if not 
ten, and to be required, in principle, only for official salaries and military rations, if 
one reckons with the capital's whole population, it is to be feared that they will not 
suffice for so much as a year or two." 15 
When grain reserves were used in Beijing, they were released principally through 
the means of pingtiao, or reduced-price sales, which provided a useful mechanism for 
maintaining the stability of grain prices within the city and in the region. Grain that 
was used in government-operated soup kitchens every winter and for emergency relief 
also came from the tribute granaries. In addition to these uses of grain reserves, much 
of the stipend grain not consumed by its recipients was sold on the local market. One 
estimate states that in 1750, 30-40 percent of the stipend grain was consumed by 
officials and bannermen themselves, 20-30 percent was bought by government 
bureaus, and the rest was circulated outside officialdom; in other words, up to 60-70 
percent of banner stipend grain, perhaps 1.2 million shi, reached the market. 16 
13Pierre-Etienne Will has estimated that about half a million shi of grain was the difference 
between the needs of the capital and the "maximum yield" of grain tribute, and this amount 
could be considered available for discretionary use (1990, 283). 
141n addition to the metropolitan granaries and the grain tribute system, there was an 
extensive system of state granaries maintained in every province. During the second half of 
the eighteenth century, the reserves of the changpingcang (ever-normal granaries) and other state 
civilian granaries in Zhili province ranged from three to four million shi. Will and Wong 
provide a comprehensive study of the state civilian granary system empire-wide (1991; see 
Table 9.14 for Zhili holdings). Li, Fighting Famine (in preparation) will further analyze the 
granary system in Zhili. 
15Dunstan 1996, 90. Translated from Shangyudang, QL9/2/23 and Qing shilu, QL, 
213:10a-12b. 
16Qingchao wenxian tongkao, 3 7 /5198, cited in Dunstan forthcoming, ch. 2. Wu 1989, 1 77 
cites Wang 1890,juan 4. 
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Thus, through these two routes-use of reserves for reduced-price sales or soup 
kitchens and sale of stipends-a substantial amount of the total grain tribute, perhaps 
two million shi, circulated on the grain market of Beijing and its environs. This market 
was not entirely "free," because the chief source of the grain, the timing and manner 
of its entry, and its price were closely monitored and regulated by the authorities. 
Nonetheless, tribute grain helped greatly to supplement the food supply and support 
the stability of the entire region, not just the capital. 
Some recipients sold their stipend grain because they preferred fresh, locally 
grown grain to granary grain that was often stale. Although we cannot construct an 
exact flow chart of grain movements, we can surmise that Beijing residents consumed 
a substantial amount of regional, nontribute, grain, constituting perhaps more than 
half of their diet. Millet, sorghum, wheat, and corn, as well as a limited amount of 
high-quality rice were grown in the capital region and the rest of Zhili province, and 
additional supplies came from adjacent provinces (Li, "Grain Prices," forthcoming). 
Although growing conditions in the Beijing region were notoriously fickle, with 
droughts and floods as common events, agriculture surrounding the capital seemed 
abundant to foreign observers. Lord Macartney reported in his diary that, traveling 
near Tianjin in fall 1793 as head of a British embassy, he saw the following crops: 
Indian corn, sorghum, millet, kidney beans, several varieties of rice, cucumbers, water-
melons, apples, pears, plums, and peaches. Between Beijing and Rebe Qehol), he 
observed: "on each side every cultivable inch is cultivated." Sorghum, millet, beans, 
peas, and sesame were "all sown in drills between which another successive crop was 
often rising in the same ground" (1963, 106). Seventy years later, Fortune identified 
the following crops growing between Tianjin and Beijing: Indian corn, buckwheat, 
sweet potatoes, soy-beans, eggplants, and "oily grain" five feet high and very 
productive (1863, 350). About the same time, Freeman-Mitford noted near the Great 
Wall rich crops of"millet and Indian corn, with undergrowths of beans or buckwheat, 
bordered with the castor-oil plant .... " (1900, 13 7). Other nongrain foods included 
meat, butter, and milk from Mongolia; pigs and poultry; vegetables from suburban 
and Outer City gardens; fruit such as pears, apples, plums, cherries, and grapes from 
nearby sources; and fresh fish from Tianjin (Ripa 1846, 61-63; Timkovsky 1827, 
189-93, 199-201; Davis 1836, I:354, 362; Fortune 1863, 361-63, 348; Rennie 
1865, I:52-53, 189, 206-7; Williams 1882, I:78, 89; Freeman-Mitford 1900, 134, 
180, 282). 
Regions adjacent to the capital area and Zhili also provided grain for Beijing. 
Herran and Shandong provinces sent wheat and millet commercially as well as through 
the grain tribute system. Fengtian, in Manchuria, also became a major source of millet 
for the capital region. In the early eighteenth century, the dependence of Beijing on 
Fengtian grain already was clear to the Kangxi emperor. In 1709, he observed in an 
edict that the price of grain in the capital was very high. (Millet cost 1.2 taels per 
shi, and wheat 1.8.) Although some officials had speculated that the price rise was 
due to population growth, the emperor noted that many Herran, Shandong, and Zhili 
peasants had gone to open up new land in the border areas, and also that the grain 
supply of the capital was often dependent on cheap supplies, especially sorghum and 
millet, from beyond the Great Wall (kouwai) (Qing shilu 240:14-15, KX 48/11/24; 
reference from Susan Naquin). 
The recent work of Chinese scholars such as Wu Jianyong and Han Guanghui 
supports the view that regional supplies were important in supplementing grain 
tribute and contributing to price stabilization (Wu 1989, 1994; and Han 1993, 
19966). Just as food prices within Beijing were sensitive to the distribution and sale 
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Table 3. Beijing Grain Prices, 1778 (QL 43/7 /1 l) 
(Price in silver taels per shi) 
jingmi (capital rice) 
laomi (old tribute rice) 
suomi (low-grade tribute rice) 
cangmi (granary grain?) 
xiaomi (millet) 
shang baimai (high-grade white wheat) 
gaoliang (sorghum) 
heidou (black beans) 
ganmian (dry noodles) 
qiemian (fresh noodles) 
Exchange Rates 
yuanbao silver, one tael = 925 wen zhiqian (cash) 









21 wen cash per Jin 
20 wen cash per Jin 
Source: Price list for Beijing found as enclosure near memorial ofZhili Governor-General Zhou 
Yuanli, dated QL 43/7 /11, in Junjidang (Grand Council archives) 20508, Taibei, Palace 
Museum Archives. 
of stipend grain, as discussed below, they were vulnerable as well to fluctuations in 
local and regional harvests, which in turn depended on highly variable weather 
conditions. In one example, in 1751 a Shuntian prefecture official reported that the 
price of grains in the seventh month had risen quite high. The grain brokers (mihang) 
in the city told him that because of recent rains, the various local grains could not 
make it to the market, and the inventory of the shops was low. Later questioned about 
why prices had fallen after the sixteenth of the month, they said that the shops had 
heard that the granaries would be opened on the twentieth. 17 This example 
demonstrates the sensitivity of the market to both tribute supplies and local 
agricultural conditions. 
Despite the formidable gates and walls of the city and the efforts of the 
gendarmerie, Beijing's economy was not hermetically sealed off from its hinterland. 
While there is no grain price data for the city that can be analyzed at this time, it 
seems almost certain that Beijing's prices were well integrated with those of the 
surrounding region. 18 Economic logic suggests that even a small amount of grain 
moving in and out of the city gates would have created some price integration. 
17QL 16/7/20 [1751), Gongzhongdang Qianlongchao zouzhe, 1:192. We thank Susan Naquin 
for this reference. 
18The Qing bureaucracy collected and reported on a monthly basis to the throne grain 
prices from every province of the empire from the beginning of the Qianlong period to the 
end of the dynasty. Most of these monthly reports are preserved in the Qing archives in Beijing 
and Taibei. A study of the grain prices for Zhili will be contained in Li "Grain Prices," 
forthcoming, and Fighting Famine, in preparation. As mentioned above, the Zhili province 
monthly grain reports give the prices for Shuntian prefecture exclusive of the Daxing and 
Wanping districts where Beijing was located. Some undetermined number of price reports for 
Daxing and Wanping are housed at the First Historical Archives in Beijing, but they have 
not been systematically located and catalogued. Some miscellaneous copies of the Daxing and 
Wanping price reports were obtained by author Li from Taibei in 1982 and Beijing in 1992, 
but they are not numerous enough to allow quantitative analysis. Table 3 is a sample of such 
a report. 
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Table 3 reproduces a grain price report from 1778 and shows the clear hierarchy 
of preferences in the capital grain market. Two grains of local and regional origin-
high-grade white wheat and capital rice-fetched the highest price. Millet and laomi 
were close in price. Suomi and cangmi were only a little more expensive than the 
regionally grown gaoliang. 
During years of normal harvest the movement of small quantities of grain was, 
in all likelihood, relatively unrestricted as the sale of stipend grain was 
counterbalanced by the marketing of regional grains, both within the Outer City and 
just outside the thirteen external gates of the Inner and Outer Cities. During years 
of poor local harvest, however, when outside prices would rise, the authorities probably 
became more vigilant in guarding the gates to see that no stipend grain was taken 
out for sale beyond the city-which would cause Beijing prices to rise even higher. 
Gendarmerie documents show that gate restrictions were especially emphasized in 
hardship years CTWSL 4:59ab (1822}; 4:60ab (1817}; 4:63a (1807}; 4:64a-66b (1806, 
1808, 1810}; 4:67a-68a (1804}). Under such circumstances, officials also would 
become alarmed about sales of stipends at Tongzhou, preferring that grain be brought 
into the Inner and Outer Cities to help lower prices within the gates. In addition, 
Beijing grain shops would be subject to more inspections to guard against "hoarding," 
tunji, 19 as we shall see. 
Grain Stipends: Distribution and Timing 
The original purpose of the grain tribute was to provide stipends to the imperial 
family, court nobles and functionaries, high officials, and bannermen living in the 
walled capital and its suburbs. Stipends for princes and officials were called fengmi; 
those for bannermen were called jiami or bingmi. Levels for both were fixed by rank. 
From the beginning of the dynasty the stipends had consisted of two parts: silver and 
grain. 
The highest ranking Manchu princes (qinwang) received annually 10,000 taels of 
silver and 5,000 shi of grain (HBZL 73:1 (1874}). By contrast, banner stipends were 
more modest although in the early postconquest period, they were "more than ample 
to meet the needs of the time," according to Pamela Crossley's study. Bannermen 
were given a monthly stipend in silver and an annual grain allowance distributed 
twice a year. In addition, beans were allotted for the bannermen's horses, allowing 
from three to six horses per man. Grain stipends ranged from twenty shi per month 
for a general-in-chief to one shi for an infantry private. The assumption was that the 
private would support a family of four while a general-in-chief would have a large 
household of eighty or more staff and servants. 20 After 1686 (KX 25), the amounts 
of stipends and allowances were standardized. For example, for corporals in certain 
19The term "hoarding," tunji, was a stock phrase in official discourse about grain trade 
and storage, almost as common as the stock phrase "mean merchants," jianshang. To the officials 
it was illegitimate for merchants to purchase and then withhold grain from the market until 
the prices became very high. The officials wanted to see a constant and rapid circulation of 
grain so that prices would remain low and stable. To this end, if merchants retained a large 
inventory, this could lead to "hoarding." Because stocking and storage always verged on il-
legitimacy, these steps are never described neutrally, and the term tunji is always used. To 
convey the attitude of the officials, we have always translated the term tunji in its literal way, 
as "hoarding." 
20This description follows Crossley (1990, 51-53). She notes that in reality a bannerman 
rarely had more than one horse. 
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banner divisions the silver allowance was four taels per month and the grain allowance 
was 46 hu (or 23 shi) per year; for cavalry privates, three taels and 46 hu; for infantry 
corporals two taels and 22 hu, and for ordinary privates, one and a half taels and 22 
hu (Chen Jiahua 1985, 63-66). 
Rank also determined the kinds of grain received. Originally, grain stipends for 
princes and officials consisted of various proportions of baimi, gengmi, and suomi 
(different kinds of rice, as shown above) and sumi (millet); stipends for bannermen did 
not include the superior baimi (HDSL 186:4a, 1731 [YZ 9}). According to a precedent 
of 1737 [QL 2}, the banner stipends consisted of 50 percent gengmi, 35 percent suomi, 
and 15 percent millet (CYQS 60:6). In reality, however, minor short-term 
substitutions and adjustments often were made. If there was an excess of one kind of 
grain, it could be substituted for another kind. For example, in 1744 too much gengmi 
was stored and not enough suomi; therefore, for a limited number of months, only 
gengmi was to be distributed (HDSL 186:8a). In 1782, officials reported that there 
was too much baimi in one granary but too little suomi and millet. Citing precedents 
from 1742 and 1763, they suggested that in issuing stipends to Manchu and Chinese 
officials, old baimi be substituted for suomi and millet (CYQS 61:56-6). In these 
substitutions, one motive of the authorities was to use up grain that had been stored 
too long. In 1768 officials wrote: "If grains are mixed up and cannot be separated 
into three categories (gengmi, suomi, and millet), distribute it all until you reach the 
bottom, using the old grain first" (CYQS 62:9). 
Great attention was paid to the timing of grain stipend distributions because 
they had a strong impact on market prices. Officials feared that if the stipends were 
not distributed evenly throughout the year, or if they were so distributed but not 
promptly collected, hoarding would lead to price manipulation. The original schedule 
called for distributing both official (guan) and military (bing) stipends twice a year, in 
the second and eighth lunar months (spring and autumn). Each distribution was to 
be completed in three months. In 1704 (KX 43), the autumn military stipend was 
moved to the tenth month and both spring and autumn distribution periods were 
limited to two months. Officials were severely punished for any delays. In 1723 (YZ 
1), the official grain was given out in the second and eighth months as before, but 
the military distribution was divided into three payments in the third, seventh, and 
eleventh months. Duration of both official and military distributions again was 
limited to two months (CYQS 60:26-5). Thus there were distributions in the second, 
third, seventh, eighth, and eleventh months each year. 
In 1752 (QL 17) the payment schedule for the different banners was staggered: 
the yellow and bordered yellow banners received their allowances in the first, fourth, 
seventh, and tenth months; the white, red, and bordered white banners received theirs 
in the second, fifth, eighth, and eleventh months; and the bordered red, blue, and 
bordered blue received theirs in the third, sixth, ninth, and twelfth months (CYQS 
60: 14). The purpose of evening out the stipend payments throughout the year was to 
reduce opportunities for hoarding and manipulation. As the 1752 edict stated: "In 
the past the banner stipends were given out four times a year, and it was the practice 
of the merchants to take advantage and hoard the grain." 
Failure to collect stipends promptly often posed a problem. At the beginning of 
the Yongzheng period (1723), the announced interval for collecting grain stipends 
was shortened to fifty days. In 1737 (QL 2), banner distributions were increased to 
four times per year. The banner grain office was to prepare a register and submit it 
twenty days in advance (HDSL 1143:156; CYQS 60:66 dates this change at 1738 or 
QL 3). In 1761 (QL 26), the rules were changed again: officers of the eight banners 
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were given two months to collect their stipends, while soldiers were limited to one 
month for theirs (HDSL 606:20ab). In 1768 (QL 33), the importance of prompt 
collection of stipend grain was emphasized once again (CYQS 60). 
When market prices already were high (as, for example, because of unfavorable 
weather conditions affecting local crops and transport), an early distribution of 
stipends could be authorized to allow prices to level off. An edict of 1758 (QL 23) 
reported: "Recently the price of rice (mi) in the capital has gone up and is quite 
expensive compared to last year. Usually the stipend grain of the capital officials is 
given out in the eighth month, but this year let us do it a month earlier. Let us open 
the granary in the seventh month to allow grain to be abundant and prices both inside 
and outside the capital to level off and then decrease" (HDSL 186:llb). The year 
1824 (DG 4), which followed an extensive Zhili flood disaster, had an intercalary 
seventh month, usually an occasion for an extra month's banner stipend. An early 
distribution of that bonus was authorized in the third month as a sign of imperial 
blessing to provide famine relief. The edict remarked: "If we wait until the intercalary 
month, people will have a difficult time" (CYQS 61:22ab; HDSL 1139:17ab). 
Sale of Stipends 
Stipendiaries of all ranks sold at least part of their stipends but for different 
reasons. At the high-status end, princes, nobles, and high-ranking officials received 
as stipends far more grain than they and their households could possibly consume. If 
they sold it, they received additional income, and if they sold at Tongzhou, they 
avoided the cost of transporting the grain into the capital (Wu 1989, 179; CYQS 
63). At the other end, bannermen of inferior rank sometimes were forced by financial 
hardship to sell their stipends for cash, even when the grain was barely sufficient for 
their needs. With the cash they could purchase coarser, less expensive grains, and/or 
make other urgent expenditures. 
The Yongzheng emperor believed that many Manchus did not know how to 
manage their household incomes and had become too extravagant: 
They want to eat meat every day, drink wine, and wear beautiful clothes .... The 
price of meat is 100 wen per jin. . . . If a large number of people would buy less, the 
price would go down .... The Han people know how to be thrifty. Even among the 
rich households, very few eat meat every day. The poor people pursue their daily 
livelihood and have just enough to eat. If the Manchus et al. could be thrifty, stay 
in their respective positions, reduce their meat consumption and eat only vegetables 
with each meal, they could save some of their monthly cash stipend, have a small 
surplus, and make a budget; then they would naturally prosper and become self-
sufficient. 
(HDSL 1146:14a-15b, 1727 [YZ 5}) 
A far more fundamental factor, however, was the distinct preference ofbannermen, 
and other northerners, for the coarse grains of millet and sorghum, and later for 
wheat-all of which were staple crops of the north-over rice. "The people of Zhili 
most importantly value sorghum and millet, and after that spring wheat and 
buckwheat," observed the officials. "Beijing has one million households, which eat a 
lot of wheat .... The more that is shipped the more that is sold, and [this} causes 
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the market price to be level" (Gaozong shilu 214, 1058; cited in Wu 1989, 171).21 In 
1812, proposing that sorghum (gaoliang) be used instead of millet for relief at 
Chengde, Manchuria, one official justified the change by saying, "We know that 
banner households are accustomed to eating gaoliang" (ZPZZ, NZZJ 0077, JQl 7 /11/ 
16). In the nineteenth century, Western observers, too, reported that Beijing residents 
preferred wheat and coarse grains to rice (Freeman-Mitford 1900, 138; Fortune 1863, 
338, 347-48, 362-63). 
Not only had bannermen not developed a taste for rice, but much of the 
stipendiary rice was stale by the time it had been stored for two or three years and 
distributed. In fact, the local term laomi ("old rice") described precisely this kind of 
rice. Although a common part of the Beijing diet, it understandably was not the 
preferred grain. 22 If bannermen sold their rice stipends rather than eating them, they 
could use the cash obtained to purchase fresh local wheat or millet for their own 
consumption. And, as we have seen in Table 3, millet was about the same price as 
laomi, and sorghum was less expensive. 
For all of the above reasons, the sale of stipendiary grain was practiced almost 
from the beginning of the dynasty, periodically causing policy debates among Qing 
officials. During the Kangxi period (1662-1722), bannermen would sell their stipends 
immediately upon receipt to merchants, who might hoard the grain. The same 
bannermen later would be forced to the market to buy grain, which they now 
absolutely needed, at higher prices than they had received for their stipendiary grain. 
To address this problem, in 1728 (YZ 6), twenty-four Eight-Banner grain bureaus 
(Bagi miju) were set up in Beijing and two additional ones at Tongzhou. With annual 
funding of eight thousand taels, each bureau was to buy grain from the bannermen 
at current prices and sell it back to them when they needed it at a pingjia or stable 
price. By purchasing, storing, and reselling grain, these bureaus in principle formed 
a closed circuit and were intended to serve the interests of the banners exclusively. 
But in reality it was not a closed system. Some bannermen must have continued to 
sell grain directly to merchants; and the buyers of the pingjia or stable-price grain 
were not necessarily bannermen. One source suggests that the old banner grain was 
bought also by outsiders, including "bannermen and people from near and far," as 
well as "people in search of food, itinerant laborers, government functionaries and 
various types from other areas. "23 These bureaus operated for more than twenty years 
before they were disbanded in 1752 (QL 17). They had not actually kept prices stable, 
in officials' view, and moreover the danger of forced purchases (possibly from 
211n another publication, Wu Jianyong writes that before the mid-Qing period Beijing 
residents ate mostly rice, but after the decline of grain tribute in the Daoguang period, their 
preferences changed. By 1911, rice constituted only thirty percent of the diet (1997, 345 n. 
11). The allegation of a sharp nineteenth-century shift of preference from rice to wheat and 
coarse grains is difficult to document, but the estimate of preferences in the twentieth century 
is probably reliable. 
22Laomi was often reddish in color, had a bland taste, and was deficient in search (Qingmo 
Beijing zhi ziliao 1994, 530). Regulations of the Board of Punishments for the treatment of 
prisoners in Beijing said that they should be fed one large bowl (half jin) of rice made of laomi 
in the morning, one medium-sized bowl of laomi zhou (gruel) each for lunch and dinner (147). 
Jailed criminals at the gendarmerie headquarters (Bujun tangling yamen) ate laomi, some of 
which had been confiscated by police at the city gates (JWSL 12:38a [nd}). We have already 
pointed out that the emperor and court ate locally grown rice. See note 2 above. 
23Qingchao wenxian tongkao, 3 7 /5197. Identified but differently translated in Dunstan forth-
coming, ch. 2. We are grateful to Helen Dunstan for making her translation available. This 
passage is also in Wang Qingyun 1890, 390. 
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bannermen by corrupt officials) was too great. 24 In the Yongzheng period (1723-
1735) when the bureaus were initiated, grain supply was plentiful and prices low, 
but when prices were higher in the 1740s and 1750s, there seemed no benefit for any 
party in trying to restrict stipend sales to government-run bureaus. In fact, there is 
some suggestion that the fine grains stored by the bureaus were not much in demand 
and sometimes rotted (Hosoya 1974, 190). 
In 1787 (QL 52) a proposal to revive the grain bureaus was defeated. Three reasons 
for this decision were given in the imperial rescript: (1) with population growth and 
pressure, it was not possible to stop inflation; (2) if the circulation of grain were to 
be impeded, the benefit would fall to the merchants, not the people; and (3) the 
bureaus lent themselves to official corruption. In the opinion of Wu Jianyong, this 
decision marked a shift in state policy that reflected the greater respect for merchants 
and trade in the Qianlong reign (1736-1795), quite different from that of the 
immediately preceding Yongzheng period. By the 1780s, the banner bureaus were 
seen as too repressive of trade. Moreover, it was true that they had afforded plenty of 
opportunity to profiteering officials (Wu 1989, 180). For Helen Dunstan, the 
disbanding of the bureaus marked a shift from the Yongzheng-early Qianlong "supply 
protectionism" that was "intensely interventionist" to a belief in the free circulation 
of grain that has the appearance of a kind of economic liberalism. 25 
When we consider, however, the intense suspicion with which grain merchants 
continued to be viewed by officials, and the extreme measures that the latter 
sometimes used to restrict the activities of the former, we should be cautious about 
attaching great significance to the abolition of the Eight-Banner grain bureaus and 
viewing the decision as a vote for economic liberalism. The bureaus did not accomplish 
the goals for which they were established, and they may have interfered with the 
circulation of grain and hence with price stability. The authorities recognized 
implicitly that it was impossible to cordon off the economy of the bannermen from 
that of the city and the metropolitan region, and they also saw the interest of the 
state in providing food security for the population at large, not just for the banners 
and the court. 
The official position from the mid-eighteenth century on was that the sale of 
stipend grain was desirable because it allowed for circulation. Somehow, after 1752, 
stipendiaries low and high sold their grain without the formal institution of banner 
bureaus. But the mechanisms by which this was done are not clearly documented. 
The official statutes of the Board of Revenue expressly forbade the operation of private 
miju. "Mean merchants and hoarders at Tongzhou or near Beijing who privately set 
up miju to purchase fengmi are to be strictly apprehended and punished by the 
managing officials, but clerks and runners are forbidden to interfere with those private 
stores that sell grain in the markets" (HBZL l 7:35a; also HDSL 191:30ab, [QL 34}). 
Nevertheless, the Tongzhou granary corruption crisis of 1809 reveals that privately 
established miju were operating near the Tongzhou granaries, as will be seen below. 
When the corruption case erupted, all these miju were given three months to move 
into the city. Evidence in the case further revealed that there had been many private 
miju located near the granaries outside the Chaoyang gate of the Inner City at Beijing, 
24Shizong shilu 66, cited in Wu 1989, 179-80. See Dunstan 1988, section 31, and Dunstan 
forthcoming, ch. 2, for a discussion of reasons for creating and later disbanding the rice bureaus. 
251n her 1996 book, Dunstan refrains from categorically identifying this shift as "sprouts 
of liberalism," as she did in earlier papers. She writes: "The paradox is thus that belief in free 
circulation is not the same thing as economic liberalism" (257, 330-31). 
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twenty-nine in the Left battalion (Zuo ying), and thirty-seven in the Northern 
battalion area (Bei ying) of the Chinese Green Standard gendarmerie (Wu ying) (JWSL 
4:61a-62a UQ 13/intercalary 5/13]). 
Despite the general endorsement of stipend sales, officials continued to urge 
vigilance against hoarding by merchants. The sale of grain to brewers was a particular 
problem. In 1752, Fang Guancheng, governor-general of Zhili, memorialized: 
In addition to this year's second month salary, the fall salary and next year's second 
month official stipends all are being given in advance. It is hoped that the Manchu 
and Han officials will not sell [the stipendiary grain} to the merchants, who will 
hoard it, or to the brewers. The situation should be watched. Every month cases of 
hoarding and/or brewing should be reported by local officials. In the third month, 
38 zhou and xian [districts} have reported no hoarding. 
(QL 17 /?/14, Gongzhongdang Qianlongchao zouzhe 1979, IV, 597) 
Stipend sales at Tongzhou were usually encouraged. An example is found in an 
edict of 1775, which was usually issued each year: 
Hitherto it has been permitted that bannermen's extra grain be sold in Tongzhou to 
give them extra income. . . . If in addition to what bannermen are given as regular 
pay there is extra grain, those who want to sell it are permitted to do so in Tongzhou. 
Thus the bannerman should be happy, the amount of local grain will increase, and 
the market price of grain will benefit. 26 
At other times, however, authorities regarded Tongzhou sales with suspicion. As 
we have seen above, requiring princes and high officials to collect their stipendiary 
grain at Tongzhou was thought to contribute to problems springing from grain sales, 
because the Tongzhou disbursement was less supervised than that of Beijing. For 
example, the following document is from 1809 (JQ 14): 
If all the princes et al., were to sell their excess grain inside the city [Beijing}, the 
price could level off, and the people would benefit. Transport costs also would be 
saved. But if grain is sold in Tongzhou, the grain does not flow into the city [Beijing}, 
and city prices rise. The mean merchants take advantage "to hoard grain and raid 
the granaries" (tunji huicao). As a result, if the granaries are lacking grain, it is because 
of this. . . . From now on, when the princes and nobles et al. go to Tongzhou to get 
their grain, they should report [all that they do there}. The Censorate will 
memorialize and send Manchu and Han censors outside the Chaoyang gate to inspect 
the amounts coming into the city each month. All grain must be shipped into the 
city and not sold outside the city. If anyone violates this [rule}, his stipend will be 
cut off permanently. As for the others-high civil and military officials-who go to 
Tongzhou to get their stipendiary grain, as well as those officials and soldiers who 
get their grain at capital granaries outside the walls, we should devise inspection 
methods so as to be certain that they transport their grain into the city and do not 
sell it at Tongzhou .... From now on, if civil officials of the fourth rank and military 
officials under the third rank who receive their stipendiary grain outside the city are 
found to have sold their grain or to have done other bad things, they will be 
impeached. Not only will the purchaser be punished, but the seller will be sent to 
the Board [of Punishments} for deliberation and punishment. 
(HDSL 1026:12b-14a) 
26From Susan Naquin's notes from the Shangyudang 199-901, QL 40/5/10. Edict to the 
Grand Secretariat. (A similar edict usually was issued every year at the same time.) 
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Sales by officials and bannermen made the Tongzhou granaries, in effect, wholesale 
depots for commercial grain. Officials often were admonished to guard against 
cheating at both the Tongzhou and Beijing granaries (HDSL 186,passim). Sometimes 
merchants tried to bribe granary attendants to falsify measures used to weigh grain 
(HCSHZ 2/cangchu 2; also in HDSL 186, 1736 [QL 1}). Merchants were so bold as 
to place orders even in advance of distribution of stipends (HDSL 185:56, 1794 [QL 
59}). Banner officials sometimes sold their stipend tickets (mipiao) to the merchants 
instead of claiming the grain in person (HDSL 186: 15 b, 1792 [QL 5 7}). In another 
case in 1 794, merchants forged names of soldiers and tried to take government rice 
directly in payment of loans, in collusion with clerks in charge of grain distribution. 
When the authorities uncovered the case, the soldiers concerned were flogged and 
officials ruled that the borrowed sums need not be repaid (HDSL 1038: 20-24). 
Although shopowners were supposed to stay away from the granaries, their porters 
and carts often entered there despite the rule (CYQS 61: 19). At granaries in both 
locales, loan-shark Shandong merchants waited where soldiers were paid and 
demanded that payment on previous loans be made in grain. Interest rates were high 
and soldiers could never finish paying on their loans, so most of their grain went to 
the merchants (HDSL 1161:106-11, 1810 UQ 15}). In the view of the authorities, 
brazen merchants forever sought new stratagems in their constant efforts to hoard 
grain and raise prices. 
Collusion between merchants and granary attendants or watchmen (huahu) was 
endemic in the Jiaqing and Daoguang periods (1796-1850). The following passage 
from 1802 (JQ 7) describes this situation: 
It has not been forbidden for officials and military to sell the extra portion of 
stipendiary grain that they do not need to consume themselves. But when the price 
of grain is high, the shopowners (puhu) wish to benefit, and the granary watchmen 
(huahu) take advantage and extort a high price, causing the market price to increase. 
When this happens the granary officials ( cangchang shilang) and the censors inspecting 
the granaries need strictly to forbid this practice, etc., and those watchmen who 
collude with the shopowners should be strictly apprehended and investigated. 
(CYQS 63:66-7) 
This document was issued during the massive 1801-1802 flood crisis, when grain 
prices skyrocketed, and illustrates why violations of the norm were most likely during 
periods of inflationary crisis, when the temptation to cheat was the greatest. It was at 
such times that the authorities invoked prohibitions against sales at Tongzhou and 
required stipend grain to be transported into Beijing before being sold, as shown in 
the 1809 example above. The particular case that provoked these strictures involved 
substantial shortages that were discovered in each of the granary buildings at 
Tongzhou. After investigation it was found that princes and noblemen were in the 
habit of selling their grain or their tickets at either Tongzhou or Beijing. The miju 
who bought the tickets then resold them to two or three head watchmen (huatou), 
who then could use them to get more than the allotted share. This is probably the 
meaning of the form of malfeasance known as "hoarding grain and raiding the 
granaries," mentioned above. (An edict in the sixth month observed that such abuses 
by granary personnel had started in 1798 UQ 3}.)27 In a similar case in 1825 (DG 
5), authorities found that the reason there was so much stipendiary grain that had 
27The documents for this case are reproduced in "Jiaqing shisinian ... " 1990. The sen-
tence that refers to corruption since 1798 is found at the bottom of p. 53. 
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gone uncollected at the Xingping granary (inside the Chaoyang gate; Li and Jiang 
1995, 170) was that the bannermen had sold their tickets to grain shops, but the 
head watchman had tried to extort money from the shops to the extent that they were 
unable to collect the grain due to them for the tickets from the granaries (CYQS 
61:22ab). 
Pingtiao and the Beijing Market 
Pingtiao, sale at reduced prices, was another way that tribute grain entered the 
market. It reflected the view that the food security of the capital could only be achieved 
by maintaining price stability both inside and outside the city. Although pingtiao was 
an ancient Chinese idea practiced throughout the land, in Qing-period Beijing it was 
a policy tool used with resources and regularity unmatched anywhere else. When there 
was a shortage of grain and prices were high, either because of regular seasonal 
variation or poor harvest conditions, grain from the tribute granaries was sold at grain 
stations (michang) in Beijing. In official documents these were referred to as "Wu 
cheng shi chang," or the ten stations of the five districts, but over time their numbers 
increased and some of their locations shifted. 28 In 1738, seven of these were in the 
Outer City and three were just outside the west, north, and east Inner City walls 
(Figure 1). In the next year, however, so many famine refugees were flocking to the 
city that the Outer City stations were moved outside the gates (Li and Jiang 1995, 
77). In 17 44 (QL 9), a year of serious drought, four more stations were added in the 
nearby suburbs: at Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge), Tongzhou, Shahe, and Huangcun 
(Gaozong shilu 216; cited in Wu 1989, 182, and Wu 1994, 386). Again in 1748, the 
emperor authorized pingtiao stations in the suburbs, citing a precedent of 17 3 7 (HDSL 
275:8a-9b. 1751 [QL 16}). In the early nineteenth century, michang were established 
on occasion at seven locations in Daxing and Wanping counties (HDSL 1899, 
275:23b-24a; Shuntianfuzhi 1885, 66:29ab). 
The consistent pattern of few if any stations in the Inner City, several in the Outer 
City, and several more in the suburbs reveals the basic purpose of pingtiao: to support 
the food security of the entire metropolitan population, not just that of the bannermen 
and other stipendiaries. During their period of operation up to 1752, the Eight-Banner 
grain bureaus also participated in this expanded pingtiao, but they were run by the 
banner authorities and by the Imperial Household Administration (Neiwu fu). The 
"Wu cheng" michang, however, were operated by the Board of Revenue, under the 
supervision of the censors of the Five Districts, the gendarmerie, Shuntian prefectural 
officials, and banner authorities. The pingtiao stations outside the city walls were 
supervised also by the local district authorities (HDSL 275:76-9, 1751 [QL16}). 
In the practice of pingtiao, prices always were set a certain amount below the 
current market price (CYQS 65:la). In 1759 (QL 24/3), for example: "The price of 
grain in Beijing is very high. Thus 50,000 shi are being distributed from the capital 
granaries and stations are being set up for pingtiao. At present the market price of one 
28The term michang usually referred to these pingtiao stations, which sold reduced-price 
grain from the tribute granaries, while the term miju referred to the Eight-banner grain 
bureaus, which bought grain from bannermen and later resold the grain at reduced prices. The 
terms are sometimes used interchangeably even in the original documents. What they had in 
common was that both were government-run institutions. Wang Qingyun (1890, 386-90) 
uses the term miju in this generic sense to include both types of institutions. 
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shi of laomi is 1,550 cash; suomi 1,340 wen; and millet 1,170 wen. Each price should 
be reduced by 100 wen" (CYQS 65:6a). 29 In general, the Board of Revenue's rules for 
reduced-price sales provided that 
The Board of Revenue should determine, according to the market price, how much 
the price should be reduced. Representatives of each of the ten stations in the Five 
Districts should go to the granaries to get the grain. (They should assume the costs 
of transport.) In selling the grain, each person should get two dou per day. It is not 
permitted to go above that limit .... [1 dou = 1/10 shi; see note 5} 
(HBZL 1874, 16:8a; also appears in 1791 edition) 
In addition to providing relief, these sales helped to rid the granaries of surplus 
stocks that were stale. There was an established schedule for semi-annual pingtiao sale 
of old grain once after the tenth month and again between the third and fourth months 
(CYQS 65:36-4). According to the Board of Revenue's regulations, the adulterated 
grain (chengse mi) that was left from the metropolitan granaries' summer and fall 
distributions, and from the Tongzhou granaries' spring distributions, was to be sold 
off after the tenth month. The adulterated grain left over from the metropolitan 
granaries' winter and spring distributions and the Tongzhou granaries' fall 
distributions should all be sold off by the third or fourth month (HBZL 1874, 16:9ab; 
also appears in 1791 edition). 
Because the most important function of pingtiao was to keep grain prices stable, 
Beijing officials also paid close attention to the price of cash (qianjia), and reported 
on it too when they reported grain prices, as Table 3 shows. Since cash (usually 
described as copper cash, actually brass) was the currency for small retail purchases, a 
shortage of cash (i.e., when one tael of silver would buy less than the nominal 1000 
cash) was as damaging to overall price stability as was a shortage of grain. The cash 
from pingtiao sales was supposed to be closely guarded and returned to the Board of 
Revenue (HBZL 1874, 16:l0ab; also appears in 1791 edition). Alternatively, on some 
occasions, merchants were invited to buy up the cash, and the silver that they paid 
was sent to the Board (CYQS 65:10 refers to a case in 1770). On occasion, local 
officials would in effect make up the deficit caused by an unfavorable exchange rate. 
In 1762, when grain and cash prices were both high, the gendarmerie was ordered to 
see that river workers who were to be paid 1000 cash were given one tael and two 
qian of silver (nominally equal to 1200 cash) (CYQS 65:76). 
Pingtiao sales were intended for individuals. The authorities were always anxious 
that grain shops might make illegal purchases and then hoard the grain, impeding 
circulation. Yet, under some conditions, they allowed limited sales to peddlers or 
merchants in order to promote circulation. One 1737 report pointed out the need to 
allow small retailers to purchase pingtiao grain because some old and weak people, or 
women, could not travel a long distance to take advantage of reduced-price grain sales. 
Thus officials recognized the need for small-scale retailers who would sell grain by 
carrying it around on their shoulders. But these merchants would be limited to storing 
no more than 50 shi of rice. Officials suspected merchants of deliberately hoarding 
rice in multiple places at once and with families bearing different surnames; thus they 
kept a close watch on operations of extremely limited size even while recognizing 
their usefulness to the people (HDSL 1160:76-8, 1737-38). 
29Li and Jiang (1995, 78-79, table) lists the market and pingtiao price schedule from 
Yongzheng 11-Daoguang 4. 
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Relief sales apparently included not only tribute grain but also wheat that may 
or may not have been part of the tribute system. In 1759 (QL 24), not only granary 
stocks but also wheat shipped from Henan and Shandong to Beijing were ordered to 
be distributed to the ten grain stations of the city for reduced-price sales. 
Representatives of flour shops went to the stations to receive tickets to buy wheat and 
grind it into flour for sale to the people. A standard amount of purchase was five shi. 
The market price of wheat at the time was 2,124 wen per shi; when reduced by 325 
wen, it equalled about 1,800 wen for reduced-price sales. The time limit for these sales 
was from the twenty-sixth day of the third month to the fifteenth day of the intercalary 
sixth month (CYQS 65:6ab). 
When they were allowed to participate in pingtiao sales, merchants found their 
role strictly controlled by the authorities. Merchants from families regarded as upright 
and financially well established were chosen. Announcements would be posted 
informing everyone that hoarding and raising the price of grain were prohibited and 
would be punished seriously. When the merchants went to the government grain 
stores to get the grain, officials would be present to observe them (HDSL 1034:126-
13, 1813). If the merchant did not have enough room to store all the grain that he 
wished, he could obtain certain limited amounts from the government at a time. For 
example, in 1813 he could take 2,500 shi once in five days, selling 500 shi each day; 
the quotas varied with circumstances. Transport fees were paid by the government 
from money paid for the grain. The rest of the funds went to the Board of Revenue 
for military expenses. 
Retailers got little profit from pingtiao business. The money that they collected 
had to be handed over to the government immediately. If they were found to sell the 
grain at a higher price than that set by the government in order to get more profit 
for themselves, all the grain that they owned, including nongovernmental grain, 
would be confiscated and sold on a pingtiao basis. In addition, the merchants would 
be punished as criminals. Profits to the merchants appear to have been mainly leftover 
rice. Having sold eighty percent of the grain or polished white rice (ximi ), for example, 
they could keep twenty percent, mostly suimi (odds and ends, broken fragments, chaff). 
This would be their fee for handling pingtiao (HDSL 1034:7-8, 1038:20-24, 1787). 
In some instances, the court explicitly ordered that private shops rather than the 
official stations be used for reduced-price sales. This decision may have reflected the 
struggle against the corruption characteristic of the last years of the Qianlong reign, 
when the bureaucracy was dominated by He Shen, the emperor's favorite. In an edict 
of the sixth lunar month of 1787, the emperor, or those who wrote in his name, 
directed that an additional 50,000 shi of grain be released for reduced-price sales to 
meet the relatively high prices that prevailed. According to custom, this grain should 
be given to the Five Districts to set up stations. But not only would the expenses be 
bothersome (jingfei zhi fan), but it would be difficult to prevent officials, clerks, runners 
and their hangers-on from colluding in fraud (chuantong zibi ). Reduced-price sales 
then would be in name only, but without substance: 
In My (Imperial) opinion it would be better to have each of the Wu cheng depute a 
high official jointly to select both inside and outside the city wealthy large grain 
shops (yinshi da puhu) to sell the official grain at reduced prices at each place. . . . If 
the shops do not respect the government-set price and still conduct private sales to 
make extra profit, not only will the government grain be given to another selected 
shop to pingtiao, but the shop's own inventory will be confiscated at the same time 
and sold at reduced price, and the merchant will be punished. 
(CYQS 65:13b-14a) 
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In 1806 CTQ 11), during a period of excessive rains, the reduced-price sales were 
once again conducted by the government-operated stations, An edict had ordered that 
40,000 shi each of rice and wheat be released for reduced-price sales in the Five 
Districts to help the poor during a period of rain and relatively high prices. The Board 
of Revenue complied, stating that 
The present market price of gengmi is 1,850 wen [per shi}. It has been decided to 
reduce it by 250 and sell it at the reduced price of 1,600. As for the wheat, wheat 
is hard to store. Previously it had been requested and granted to take 60,000 shi in 
granaries to be used for banner stipends. Now it can all be sold at reduced-price sales. 
The present price of wheat is 2,800 wen [per shi}, so reduce it by 300 wen and it will 
be 2,500 wen. As for the rice (mi) sold at reduced price, each person each day may 
buy from one or two sheng up to one dou. As for the wheat sold, each person is allowed 
to buy from one or two sheng up to two dou. They are not allowed to exceed that 
amount [1 dou = 10 sheng = 1/10 shi}. 
(CYQS 64:41a-42a) 
In 1810 CTQ 15), wheat was sold directly to shops to be ground into flour: 
Because wheat does not store long, it should be given over to the Board of Revenue 
for sale in the city to help the people [in the amount oO 74,000 shi. For granary 
wheat (caomai), the market price is 2,850 wen per shi, and should be reduced by 600 
wen to 2,250 wen. For white wheat (baimai) the market price of 2,950 wen per shi 
should be reduced by 700 wen to 2,250 wen. , .. Because the ordinary people do not 
have any grinding instruments ... [it has been proposed to} reduce each shi of both 
kinds of wheat to 1,600 wen and sell it to the shops and allow them to resell it at 
1,750 wen, 500 wen less than the original price. Afterwards the shops can grind it 
and retail the flour at 20 wen per Jin. In the Five Districts, publicize the price so 
people will know it. If the people purchase according to the [set} price, their 
subsistence will benefit and the shops will also enjoy a bit more profit [shao zhan 
yurun}. 
(CYQS 64:42ab) 
Social Unrest, Pingtiao, and Soup Kitchens 
Soup kitchens (janchang or zhouchang) normally operated in Beijing every winter. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, just as tribute grain often was used 
for emergency, as opposed to seasonal reduced-price (pingtiao) sales (CYQS 64:41-53, 
documents dated Jiaqing through Xianfeng reigns), soup kitchens also were 
increasingly used for famine relief in addition to their regular winter function. 
The regulations of the Board of Revenue stated that in Beijing's Five Districts 
every winter-from the beginning of the tenth month to the twentieth day of the 
third month-soup kitchens were to be set up for relief. For each District each day, 
2 shi of mi plus 1 tae/ for fuel were to be provided. Other provincial capitals and 
localities were directed to follow this example (HBZL 84:18-19). These official soup 
kitchens, initially ten, were located at strategic points in the Five Districts and just 
outside the gates. Most of them were located on the sites of temples. 30 Gendarmerie 
30JWSL 4:58ab; Naquin forthcoming, ch. 15. Before 1780, soup kitchens did not start 
operations until the eleventh month (ms. p. 880). 
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records show seven locations in the Outer City and three in the Inner City for an 
unspecified year (JWSL 9:58ab {nd}). 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, problems of vagrancy and beggary seemed 
to abound in the capital; gendarmerie documents of this era, especially for 1830-
1850, show many problems related to control of laili bu ming zhi ren, "people of 
unknown background" or "floating population" (JWSL 5:42a-43a {1838}; 5:60a-61a 
{1813}; 6:la-5b {1829}; 6:6a-14b {1845}; 8:8ab ({nd}; 8:14ab {1851}; 8:15a-21b 
{nd}; 8:22a-48a {nd}; 8:5 la {nd}). A persistent concern of local authorities was to 
stem the tide of poor people coming to the capital in search of relief. Demand for this 
relief was so great that sometimes people were crushed to death while waiting at soup 
kitchens, and the police were punished for failing to prevent it (JWSL 11:19a {nd}). 
Refugee problems were not entirely new. In the well-documented drought crisis 
of 1743-1744, rural people '"left in droves' ... as early as the sixth month, at the 
height of the agricultural year" (Will 1990, 41). Migration to Beijing was rapid and 
intense. Ten thousand refugees were fed by the soup kitchens in Beijing, many more 
than the norm (Will 1990, 234-35). In order to prevent crowding and disease in the 
capital, as mentioned above, extra soup kitchens on the city's outskirts were set up. 
After winter had passed, vagrants were given allowances to return home in time for 
spring planting. 
During the huge flood of 1801, officials tried to stem the tide of refugees flocking 
to Beijing by getting the word out that relief was available in the local areas (ZPZZ, 
NZZJ 0069, JQ6/6/25). In the seventh lunar month, 30,000 refugees were reported 
in Beijing (GZJS, juan 11-12), and despite efforts to keep them away, they were 
reported to be increasing at a rate of 8,000-9,000 a day, largely women and children, 
hovering by the city gates (GZJS, juan 15-16). The next spring, the soup kitchens 
were extended for another month to 4/20 from their usual 3/20 closing. Noting that 
it would be inconvenient for peasants to come to the city as the agricultural season 
was getting busy, and that the roads would be crowded, the imperial edict decreed 
that the soup kitchens of the Five Districts all move their operations outside the city 
(HDSL 273:lb). 
Reduced-price sales often were used alongside the soup kitchens in times of crisis. 
In 1811, reduced-price sale grain stations were set up outside the city gates to give 
relief to the poor. Once again the decree said that "if poor people come into the city 
to get pingtiao grain, it is a hardship {for them} because they need to travel far and 
sometimes when they arrive, it is too late." Left unsaid was the obvious advantage to 
the rulers of keeping impoverished grain recipients outside the city wall (BCSX 27 4, 
Renzong 57:19a-b UQ 16/5}). 
In the 1813 drought crisis, the same year as the assault on Beijing by White 
Lotus rebels (Naquin 1976), grain prices reached an all-time high and pingtiao was 
offered in desperation: 
Around the capital area it has been very dry since spring. Prices are very high and 
people are suffering. The Board of Revenue has permitted 40,000 shi of wheat newly 
arrived at the granary this year to be sold at reduced prices at the ten stations in the 
Five Districts. Each shi will be reduced by 600 wen to a price of 2,100. Each person 
may buy from one or two sheng to one dou daily. 
(CYQS 65:236-24) 
There also seems to have been a decision in 1813 to give grain directly to shops for 
reduced-price sales, citing the precedent of JQ 15 (1810) (on which see above) when 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.48 on Fri, 30 Jul 2021 19:49:35 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
GUARDING BEIJING'S FOOD SECURITY 1017 
wheat had been given to shops to retail. "Find rich shops to do this," said the 
instructions (BCSX 274, Renzong 57:23a, 1813 UQ 18/4}). 
In 1819, in the wake of renewed flooding of the Yongding river in and around 
Beijing, Fang Shouchou, the Zhili governor general, advocated supplying soup 
kitchens for the districts (xian) around Beijing with grain from granaries or money 
from the treasury to buy grain and mill it. He recommended that this be done until 
the commencement of general relief (dazhen) in the tenth month. In those places 
remote from transport, he said, steamed bread (mobing) or cash should be given out 
(ZPZZ NZZJ 0081, JQ 24/8/6). It was necessary to have these soup kitchens along 
the road to discourage refugees from advancing on Beijing (ZPZZ NZZJ 0081, JQ 
24/9/22). 
In 1823-1824, at the beginning of the Daoguang reign, when Beijing and the 
entire region were confronted with tremendous floods followed by a serious epidemic, 
significant quantities of grain were released for reduced-price sales at Beijing: 50,000 
shi in each year (CYQS 65:266-27, 28ab). This grain also was given to selected 
merchants to sell. In addition, the authorities set up soup kitchens where gruel was 
served to the poor. To save famine victims the hardship of daily trips to the soup 
kitchens, they were allowed to collect five days' rations at once. Normally each adult 
got three he of grain and each child a half per day. (This represented a smaller famine 
ration than had been the standard in the eighteenth century; see note 12.) In this 
crisis, each adult could collect one sheng, five he of grain and each child, a half. The 
magistrates of Wanping and Daxing were ordered to purchase grain from Herran 
(BCSX 374, Xuanzong 47:21-22, DG 3/8). So in this case soup kitchens had become 
food ration (kouliang) distribution centers. Additional soup kitchens were set up in 
some of the usual locations in the suburbs: Lugouqiao, Huangcun, Dongba, and 
Qinghe. Shelters for the refugees were erected CTFTZ 5:14ab, DG 3/7(1823}). 
Despite all these expenditures, however, the emperor observed that there were 
still many famine refugees crowding into Beijing, and there were even incidents of 
violence, of grabbing food by force. There were countless others who were fleeing 
beyond the Great Wall. To the emperor, this was a sign that the local officials had 
not done their work of distributing famine relief in the countryside; if they had, 
people would have had no need to leave their homes. If more bandits and vagrants 
appear, he said, it is a sign that the local officials are being contemptuous of the 
suffering of the masses, and they should be punished (BCSX 374, Xuanzong 47:28ab, 
DG 4/2 (1824}.) 
The grave social and political problems that started in the Daoguang period and 
lasted through the 1860s appear to have changed the emphasis in food security 
measures from pingtiao (eighteenth century) and gate restrictions (early nineteenth), 
which emphasized price stabilization, to soup kitchens, which emphasized direct 
relief. As Han Guanghui and others have shown, soup kitchens became far more 
frequently the major means of famine relief and crowd control in the nineteenth 
century.31 At the same time, pingtiao was less frequently employed because of the 
diminished capacity of the government to hold large reserves of grain. Also, there was 
an increasing tendency to locate soup kitchens outside the city walls. More soup 
kitchens were opened at even more temples. 32 By the Guangxu period, many soup 
31Han Guanghui (1996a, 23-26) has a very full list of soup kitchens in Beijing throughout 
the Qing period, as well as an informative discussion. 
32Susan Naquin's forthcoming book on Beijing will document this shift more fully. Han 
Guanghui (1996a, 25) entries also indicate this. 
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kitchens were privately operated, as part of a general trend toward private charitable 
organizations filling any vacuum left by the government. 33 The shift toward private 
charity reached such an extent that a few decades later, Sidney Gamble, a close observer 
of Beijing, mistakenly believed that under "the Empire, the poor relief [in Beijing} 
was carried on almost entirely by individuals or private associations" (Gamble and 
Burgess 1921, 267-68, 277, 304). He interpreted the assumption of responsibility 
for these activities by the government and the modernized city police as a new 
departure rather than (as it was) a return to the Qing-era pattern. 
In the late nineteenth century, after the turbulence of the Taiping period and the 
sacking of Beijing by British and French troops, Li Hongzhang began to dominate 
the capital area through his positions as Zhili governor-general and commissioner of 
northern ports. Pingtiao at Beijing was conducted with grain shipped from Fengtian. 
After arrival at Beijing, the grain was distributed through the merchant bureaus that 
had facilitated the shipment and sold to small shops in Beijing, reducing the price 
by 1-2 qian per shi. 34 The walled cities at Beijing continued to receive the most 
attention. Because of the desperate conditions in the countryside, Li Hongzhang gave 
strict orders forbidding people from other districts to come to Beijing to purchase 
grain, and famine refugees crowded into the capital. About 30 to 40 percent of the 
recipients of famine relief were outsiders, while 60 to 70 percent were local residents 
(He 1980, 52). 
How effective were these regular and emergency uses of pingtiao and soup kitchens, 
and how many people were directly affected? Without detailed price data, we cannot 
quantify the extent to which prices were stabilized by the reduced-price sales of grain. 
It is highly unlikely, however, that these considerable measures would have been 
continued over two centuries if they had not achieved noticeable economic and social 
benefits. The amounts for pingtiao cited in the sections above-ranging from 40,000 
to 74,000 shi each time-were substantial. If we use the adult famine ration standard 
of 0.005 shi of husked grain per person per day (see note 12 above), such an amount 
would have produced ten million adult rations. In the course of a month, this would 
be enough to sustain-at bare subsistence level-330,000 adults. Looking at soup 
kitchens, we know the regulations called for ten stations, two in each district, and 
each district was provided two shi of grain daily. Using the same minimum standard 
of 0.005 shi per day, these ten shi would have provided 2,000 meals per day, or 60,000 
meals a month (soup kitchens served one meal a day). Of course, in the nineteenth 
century there were many more than ten official stations routinely in operation, as well 
as numerous privately run soup kitchens; and the thin gruel that they served may 
have used even smaller amounts of grain. So, in fact, far more meals must have been 
dispensed. 
We can compare our calculations to the figures cited by Gamble for the early 
Republican period. Adding the figures reported to him by various local police 
33This was part of the overall tendency toward charitable activities involving elite parti-
cipation from all over the empire, not just the immediate locality. This trend is discussed in 
Rankin 1986, 142-47; Naquin forthcoming, ch. 15; and Li, Fighting Famine, in preparation. 
For a discussion of the merits of gentry-led relief efforts earlier in the Qing period, see Will 
1990, 314. 
34He (1980, 49-51, table 13) shows the expenses for Beijingpingtiao during the first eight 
months of 1878. Eighty-seven thousand shi of grain were sold, costing 300,000 taels and 
selling for 225,000, with net subsidized cost of 75,000 taels. The China Merchants' Steam 
Navigation Company was ordered by Li Hongzhang, its patron, to make grain purchases in 
many regions to help the north. The Beijing branch office played a role in Beijing famine 
relief. 
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Figure 2. Boys at Beijing soup kitchen, 1924-25. Although taken 
more than a decade after the fall of the Qing dynasty, this photograph 
by Sidney D. Gamble shows well the continuing role of soup kitchens in 
the city. Reproduced by permission of the Sidney D. Gamble 
Foundation for China Studies. 
authorities responsible for relief, we can see that 550-640,000 meals a month were 
dispensed at twelve soup kitchens. In the month of January 1918, over 700,000 meals 
were served (Gamble and Burgess 1921, facing pp. 270, 278). Six hundred thousand 
meals a month would have meant about 20,000 meals a day on average-a figure ten 
times the normative Qing standard of 60,000 meals a month, or 2,000 meals a day. 
During winter 1925 another source said that soup kitchens served 30,000 people a 
day (Strand 1989, 204-5). We would argue that the greater need for soup kitchens 
in the Republican period reflected not only the more chaotic political conditions-
with warlord rivalries, greater foreign presence, and more displaced persons seeking 
food and shelter-but also the breakdown of other aspects of the food security system 
that the Qing state had provided for Beijing (see Figure 2). 
Markets, Merchants, and Gendarmerie 
To a greater extent than anywhere else in the empire, in Beijing the Qing state 
maintained a tight control over the supply and marketing of grain. The state, however, 
did not tty to substitute itself for the market so much as to control and limit it as 
effectively as possible and with minimal expense to the government. Prices in the 
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pingtiao stations were set by officials, but in accordance with the prevailing market 
price. Government documents conventionally deprecated merchants as jianshang-
"mean merchants"-but their necessity and usefulness always were acknowledged. 
An ambivalent tone about merchants was characteristic; for example, in a revealing 
reflection, one memorialist commented that, after all, merchants too were one of the 
four social classes (scholar, farmer, artisan, merchant, in descending order) and should 
develop Heaven's goodness. But in the next sentence he proceeded to castigate 
merchants for their continual hoarding, which showed them to be "really hateful" 
(HDSL 1160:l0ab, (1786}). 
We already have seen several ways in which officials tried to limit or control the 
activities of grain merchants: by regulating their purchases at Tongzhou and the other 
granaries, by limiting their profits inpingtiao transactions, and by limiting the amount 
of grain that could be taken out the city gates. Because of their great fear of hoarding 
by merchants-especially hoarding grain that could be held over for more than one 
season-local officials also limited the size, location, and inventories of grain shops. 
In 1737, even amounts of 40-50 shi supposedly held by "crafty" people for 
brewing (shaoguo) were forbidden because of the concern that grain supplies would be 
affected and prices would rise. The regulations stated, however, that "those who just 
carry a few shi away on their backs should not be investigated" (HDSL 191:27b). 
"The small, ignorant people do not know anything about storage and just take the 
first price for wheat [instead of storing it until the price goes up}. Thus the merchants 
monopolize or corner the market and do not concern themselves about the food supply 
of the little people." This practice was considered to be especially severe in Linqing 
in Shandong and Zhenjiang inJiangnan, so it reflected an empire-wide concern (HDSL 
191: 27b--28a; also cited by Will 1990, 181). 
In theory, the grain shops were limited in the stock they could maintain and 
violations were punished. But exact limits showed some flexibility. Regulation of 
inventories always was aimed at the prevention of hoarding, but the amounts varied 
in each instance. For example, an early nineteenth-century document states that if the 
grain accumulation was not judged to be for hoarding, the merchant could store even 
over 160 shi, but if hoarding and profit were the goals, he could be prosecuted even 
if he had less than 160 shi (HDSL 1038:20-24, (1813}). In the 1801 flood, the 
authorities already had acknowledged that some leniency toward merchants was 
necessary: 
According to regulations, the grainshops in Beijing's Five Districts are not supposed 
to have more than 80 shi of each type of grain. If they exceed this amount, they are 
considered to be hoarding and should be punished. But in this crisis, it is important 
to keep grain circulating. According to secret investigation, grain shops in and outside 
the capital hold from several hundred to several thousand shi. Now we are raising 
the limit to 160 shi. The rest we will permit to be sold at a stable price (pingjia) and 
[we] will not permit any hoarding. Do not let the functionaries make the slightest 
excuses. 
(BCSX 273, Renzong 56:18a-19a. 1801 UQ 6/11)) (italics added) 
Secret inspections of shops were carried out by the gendarmerie, particularly in 
connection with commerce in grain in shops located near the city gates. Special 
attention was given to gates located near granaries QWSL 4:61a-62a (1808}, 64a-
66b (1810}). In 1810 a censor's memorial led to a secret police investigation of grain 
shops near the Xizhi gate in the western wall of the Inner City. The censor had feared 
that merchants were taking grain outside the city wall to hoard and sell later at a 
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higher price. Police officials reported that 32 shops did business inside the gate and 
20 outside; those inside had much larger reserves of grain, bought at city markets. 
But gendarmerie headquarters reported that all this commerce was legitimate. Grain 
stayed in the capital area. It went through the gates by permit to the Western Hills 
on the backs of donkeys, as rations to the summer palace at Yuanming yuan, to storage 
at two granaries outside the Xizhi and Desheng gates at the northwest corner of the 
Inner City, and on the backs of peasants from nearby areas in small amounts for their 
own use. Moreover, the Captain-General ofGendarmerie reported that Wu ying police 
regularly monitored all grain shops in the gate area CTWSL 4:64a-66b [1810}). But 
all grain shops, not just those near gates, were closely watched. For example, in 1856 
(XF 6) when prices had risen high in Beijing, shops were told to sell off all their 
grain within ten days and not to hoard any (HDSL 191:3lb-32a). 
Because of the bulkiness of grain, it was relatively easy for the authorities to be 
aware of shipments as they occurred and to stop those that were unauthorized. Shifts 
of gendarmerie continuously guarding the city gates could, if so ordered, permit only 
small amounts of grain bought by peasants to pass through CTWSL 4:59a-b [1822}, 
4:63a [1807}). Elaborate planning and precautions were devoted to official grain 
shipments, such as transports of grain through a gate to one of the government 
granaries CTWSL 4:45a-46a [1801}). Grain leaving the city gates as official rations 
for soldiers outside the city had to be accompanied by a pass from the Captain-General 
of Gendarmerie. Gate officers kept one part of the pass, and the other part needed to 
be returned for cancellation after the rice was consumed CTWSL 4:67a-68a [1804}). 
A good example comes from the confession of Cao Fuchang, a Chinese bannerman 
whose father was the 1813 White Lotus rebel leader Lin Qing's sworn brother. Lin 
Qing and Cao's father often ate together at the Chongxiang restaurant on the south 
side of the Chashi alley outside the Xuanwu gate. During the winter of 1808, one 
could not leave the city carrying grain. Because Lin Qing lived outside the city, Cao's 
father gave him an authorized paper falsely saying that the grain was for soldiers' 
rations, and so they let him go through. In the summer and winter of the following 
year he did this twice more. 35 
Pingtiao grain was not supposed to be moved outside the city wall; if it was carried 
through a gate, it needed to have a license and official stamp CTWSL 9.58ab [nd}). 
Gate officers were warned not to extort, hoard, or smuggle grain and not to create 
counterfeit passes. When grain was confiscated at the gates, it was either used as a 
reward to the confiscators or as food for prisoners at the gendarmerie yamen CTWSL 
1851, 4:63a [1807}). Authorities also were concerned about grain leaving the capital 
region; the banner component of the gendarmerie was responsible for keeping track of 
grain in transport inside the gates, and the Green Standard component outside them 
CTWSL 4:59ab [1822}, 64a-66b [1810}). As with other regulations regarding grain, 
these were enforced most strictly during times of poor harvests and high prices, when 
the fear was that grain merchants would be tempted to seek higher prices outside the 
city, thus causing city prices also to rise. During normal years the enforcement of this 
prohibition was probably relaxed. 
The gendarmerie was a key factor in government effectiveness in regulation of 
the grain trade in Beijing. Composed of over 33,000 men, the gendarmerie was the 
only force in the city large enough to penetrate into every street and lane and to give 
systematic attention to food security. Knowledge of merchants, prices, and market 
35Deposition of Cao Fuchang in Gugong zhoukan 227:3, 228:1. JQ 18/10/21. We thank 
Susan Naquin for this reference. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.48 on Fri, 30 Jul 2021 19:49:35 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
1022 LILLIAN M. LI AND ALISON DRAY-NOVEY 
conditions obtained by open and secret surveillance enabled the authorities to respond 
in a flexible, timely manner. Many of their tactics, such as preventive regulations on 
inventories and at gates, early release of stipends, and reduced-price sales of tribute 
grain benefited from a dependable flow of economic information and from the work 
of gendarmerie checkers and enforcers. In Japan, in equally populous Edo, by 
comparison, police were far fewer but city magistrates compensated by organizing 
large numbers of merchants and artisans to carry out tasks of regulation and poor 
relief (Kato 1994, 45-48). In both Edo and Beijing, food-related activities by the 
authorities demanded significant manpower on a routine basis. Thus in Beijing it was 
not the imperial tribute and granary system alone, but rather its local combination 
with the daily, ground-level activities of a massive human institution-the 
gendarmerie-that assured the food security of the capital. 
Another factor facilitating governmental control was that in Beijing, as in other 
urban centers in China, the scale of grain marketing was kept relatively small. 36 There 
were over a thousand small shops called duifang, run by Shandong merchants, that 
husked or processed grain (often stipend grain that reached the market through 
pingtiao) and then peddled it in the neighborhoods of the city (Wang 1890, 387; 
Hosoya 1974, 186, Elliott 1993, 372). Qing-era visitors consistently noted that all 
kinds of grain and other foods were sold in small-scale shops and by peddlers up and 
down the streets of both Inner and Outer Cities (Anderson 1795, 138; Timkovsky 
1827, 2:190; Williams 1848, 1:68-69; Kovalevsky 1853, 1:143-46; Fortune 1863, 
362,370; see also Bredon 1922, 60-61). A well-regarded late-Qing Japanese gazetteer 
noted that Beijing merchants were mostly small-scale; large merchants were very rare 
(Qingmo 1994, 343 ). Grain shops were located, among other places, inside the Qian 
(Zhengyang) gate, Qiaozi hutong, inside the Xizhi gate, and also inside the Qihua 
(Chaoyang) gate (Qingmo 1994, 345). Many travelers also commented on the handsome 
decoration of the shops and the colorful and lively air in the streets (Ellis 1818, 134; 
Williams 1848, 1:68-69, Fortune 1863, 362-63; Kovalevsky 1853, 1:143-46). 
Drawings in the early eighteenth-century scroll Wanshou shengdian show many small 
shops along streets in the northwest suburbs and Inner City selling grain, vegetables, 
tea, candy, wine, medicine, and other foods; a large number of food peddlers also 
appear (WSSD 1717, 41: 14a, 27a, 40a, 53a, 54a; 42:3ab, 4ab, 66). (See Figure 3.) 
Elsewhere in the capital region small-scale grain commerce prevailed, even at the 
wholesale level. At Tongzhou, where officials were vigilant against manipulation of 
the market, merchants were constantly under surveillance and every attempt was made 
to limit their scale of business. According to Governor-General Zhou Yuanli in 1778, 
there were 220 "guest"' merchants at Tongzhou, each of whom had a stock of about 
100 to 1,000 shi of wheat. There was a total stock of 200,000 shi. While he considered 
this a desirable situation, he thought that newly arrived merchants should not be 
compelled to limit their inventories lest they be discouraged from doing business 
there (GZD 035185, QL 43/6/8). Nevertheless, there was an investigation of the 
warehouses that normally stored the large shipments of wheat from Henao, Shandong, 
and Jiangsu, and sold the stock gradually to retailers in Beijing and Tongzhou. Such 
a large inventory (200,000 shi) remained in 1778 that officials were suspicious that 
merchants were withholding stocks in anticipation of a poor harvest. After a thorough 
investigation, the authorities concluded that the eighty or more merchants suspected 
36The reference to "wealthy large grain shops•• in 1787 and to "rich shops"' in 1813 cited 
above are the only such descriptions that we have seen, and the concept of "large"' is not 
quantified. Wu (1997, 280 n. 10) mentions one large grain merchant family, located just 
outside the Chongwen gate, that was prominent from the Ming to the end of the Qing. 
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Figure 3. Police armed with swords and whips in front of a small 
grain shop, 1713. Their presence on this occasion is at least partly 
connected to an imperial procession, but the gendarmerie rountinely 
regulated grain merchants. A money-changing shop is located across the 
street. (WSSD 1713, ce 16 juan 41, Harvard-Yenching Library; found 
also in 1717 edition at 42:6b). 
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were not guilty of actual hoarding and therefore should not be punished. Under 
pressure, however, the merchants volunteered to sell the whole of the remaining stock 
within two months at a price 0.2 taels per shi below the current price. The emperor 
then reduced this self-imposed penalty to 0.1 taels. 37 
Like many means, direct and indirect, employed by the Qing state to control and 
limit commerce in grain, the atomization of the trade was not limited to the capital 
and its region. In the metropolitan region, however, the state's capacity to enforce it 
was greater. At Tianjin, the major seaport, and Baoding, the provincial capital, the 
grain trade was also small in scale. 38 Differing from trade in salt, silk, or other 
important commodities, the grain trade of the Chinese empire never had large-scale 
merchants who achieved economic influence and personal stature. An examination of 
over one hundred local gazetteers from Zhili province does not reveal even one grain 
merchant mentioned by name. Other sources refer to a few large dealers in Tianjin in 
the early nineteenth century. 39 There were no Chinese counterparts of the Cargills or 
Thellussons of the West. Unlike authorities in eighteenth-century France, Chinese 
officials had no need to negotiate with large grain magnates. 
As noted above, some historians both inside and outside China have seen a trend 
toward liberalization of trade in the mid- to late-Qing period, spurred by an 
ideological transformation, a recognition of the importance of free markets and respect 
for merchants.40 The decline in government intervention can certainly be seen in the 
grain trade, even in the capital area, where the state's role was greater than elsewhere, 
but it was prompted more by circumstance than by ideology. The decline of the grain 
tribute system and the other aspects of Qing fiscal weakness meant that the state 
simply could not command the resources that it had marshaled in the eighteenth 
century, and could no longer successfully enforce a free circulation of grain by 
restricting inventories and controlling hoarding. When the state turned to merchants 
to perform functions previously undertaken by the state, it was not because of a more 
positive view of merchants, but because its fear of bureaucratic corruption became 
more immediate than its fear of merchant connivance. In effect, corruption was part 
of the cost to the state of its intervention in the grain market. When this cost rose 
too high under either governmental or private auspices, the government switched to 
alternative channels to reduce it. We already have seen this tendency in pingtiao 
arrangements during the He Shen years. This was also apparent in the Daoguang 
crises. In the flood crisis of 1823-1824, the emperor ordered officials to purchase grain 
from as far away as Taiwan and Fujian, but he ordered the purchases to be delivered 
not to local functionaries, but rather to merchants recruited for the occasion to ship 
the grain to Tianjin and Beijing (JFTZ 1871, 5:23ab, DG 4/3). 
Conclusion 
Through single-minded determination and clever statecraft, and aided by the 
prosperity of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Qing rulers achieved 
37Translated and summarized in Dunstan 1988 ms., 533-34, n. 26, from Tongzhou zhi 
1879, 10:23a-27a. 
38This is discussed in Li, Fighting Famine, in preparation. 
39There is mention of three large grain dealers in Tianjin starting from the Xianfeng 
period. See Tianjin wenshi ziliao xuanji, 20, 1982/8, 40--41. 
40The writings of Wu Jianyong, cited above in the section on stipends, are most note-
worthy in this regard. Outside of China, Dunstan 1996, Dunstan forthcoming, Rowe 1993, 
and Will 1999 have focused on the relationship between state and market in the Qing. 
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an impressive degree of food security for Beijing. Grain flowed to the capital area 
from both north and south. Numerous large granaries were visible to everyone. 
Tribute grain was not supposed to enter the capital unguarded or leave it freely; guards 
at the sixteen gates in the city walls, on duty day and night, could enforce these rules. 
The marketing and pricing of grain were monitored, influenced, and when necessary, 
controlled by government. The urban population, consumers and sellers of grain, was 
watched in numerous interlocking ways, including preventive police patrol, secret 
investigations, and a semi-annual census of all households, shops, and temples (JWSL 
5:57a-59a, 5:60a-6la, 6:la-5b, 6:6a-14b, 6:15a-18a, 12:15a-23b, 12:3la-34a; 
Dray-Novey 1981, 220-35). The "riff-raff' from the countryside was kept away, often 
by means of reduced-price sales or charity distribution of grain outside the walls. 
Despite frequent local harvest crises and some major disasters, overall price 
stability and food security were maintained even during the multiple nineteenth-
century difficulties of the Qing dynasty.41 The Beijing populace never seized upon 
food scarcity or high food prices as causes of dissatisfaction with the Manchu rulers. 
There was an annual net inflow of tribute grain, even though much of this was not 
consumed by those for whom it was intended. This situation can be contrasted with 
the experience of London in the early eighteenth century, when urban residents could 
see vast quantities of grain being exported by grain dealers to foreign destinations, 
thus causing local scarcities (Ormrod 1985, 88-91). With the approval of the crown, 
Britain remained a major grain exporter until it faced the necessity of feeding 
concentrated urban factory populations in the mid-nineteenth century (Tilly 1975, 
416). In Beijing, however, massive granaries along the eastern and northern walls of 
the city and at nearby Tongzhou, as well as the constant busy traffic of grain junks 
on the canal, were ever-present visual reminders of the capital's food supply and the 
unshakeable political will to maintain it. Even after the grain tribute was increasingly 
transported by sea, the late Qing government tried to avoid social disturbance due to 
food scarcity. Although there are some instances of food-related protests in other parts 
of China-for example in Hunan in the eighteenth century-the urban food riot was 
not part of the political life of Beijing (Wong 1982, 767-88).42 
Protecting the food security of Beijing, however, was not entirely the same as 
maintaining the economic security of the bannermen and their families or preventing 
poverty among urban dwellers. The Qing dynasty did not meet these latter challenges 
so successfully as it did the first. The inadequacy of banner stipends was felt as early 
41ChenJinling 1988 says that Beijing grain prices were stable in the eighteenth century, 
but that in the nineteenth century prices rose faster than in other places in China. His con-
clusions are based on anecdotal evidence, not a price series. Li 1992 provides long-term price 
trends for Zhili province that show overall price stability and slow inflation. The price effects 
of major and minor subsistence crises were serious, but never so great as the subsistence crises 
of Europe before the mid-eighteenth century. See esp. p. 93. Li, Fighting Famine, in preparation, 
will provide an updated version of these findings. 
42The following contrary observation by Williams (1848, 1.69-70), however, is not con-
firmed by any other source: "The poor, who resort thither [to Beijing} from other parts of the 
province, form a needy and troublesome part of the population, sometimes rising in large mobs 
and pillaging the granaries to supply themselves with food, but more commonly perishing in 
great numbers from cold and hunger." Williams slightly edited but did not remove this 
sentence from the second edition of The Middle Kingdom (1882), published more than thirty 
years later when the author and other foreigners had had far more opportunity to know Beijing. 
It is possible that Williams' informant had in mind incidents of crowding and crushing to 
death in soup kitchens. Susan Naquin notes that disturbances in Beijing were more often 
caused by examination candidates (private conversation). 
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as the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The general economic decline 
of the bannermen over the course of the dynasty has often been described. Prevented 
for long periods from working at nonmilitary occupations, bannermen were heavily 
dependent on stipend rates set in the seventeenth century and cut in the nineteenth 
century (Crossley 1990, 52-54, 147-48). Not only were bannermen in Beijing and 
other garrisons poorly prepared to deal with the outside economic world, but in 
addition the cost of living in Beijing is said to have risen in the nineteenth century 
(Chen Jiahua 1985, 240-43). Han Guanghui shows a gradual increase in banner 
numbers and growing banner poverty as some did not receive stipends and some 
Chinese bannermen or hanjun even returned to the life of commoners (Han 19966, 
318-19). After the fall of the dynasty, a social survey showed the remaining Manchu 
population in Beijing to have an average income half that of the Chinese (Crossley 
1990, 216, citing Gamble and Burgess 1921). Despite the dynasty's achievement of 
long-term food security in the capital, the deterioration in the economic and physical 
well-being of the banner forces weakened the Chinese state during a critical period. 
The irony of banner decline in the much-protected Beijing dynastic stronghold 
underscores once more the primacy accorded the goal of food security for the capital 
as a whole, not just its rulers. This larger view of food security may be contrasted to 
the policies of the Tokugawa authorities in Edo in the same period. As James McClain 
and Ugawa Kaoru observe, the "Tokugawa regime ... went to considerable lengths 
to create mechanisms to supply water, food, and other essentials to all of Edo's 
residents, but within that framework it paid particular attention to the needs of the 
samurai estate" (McClain and Ugawa 1994, 461). Because the incomes of the 
Tokugawa retainers were dependent on the value of their grain stipends when sold 
on the market, the authorities pursued a policy of keeping grain prices high, even in 
years of natural crisis such as 1733. Only when faced with evidence of widespread 
starvation did they lift the ban on imports of grain from neighboring regions.43 The 
Edo commoners expected the state to protect them; on each of the three occasions in 
the Tokugawa period (1600-1868) when they rioted against grain merchants, they 
assumed that the state stood behind the merchants (Walthall 1994, 407, 410, 413, 
428). Qing food policy differed fundamentally from that of the Tokugawa shogunate 
in that the interests of the ruling class were not put first. Unlike the Tokugawa 
shoguns and feudal lords, the Qing rulers wanted low, not high, grain prices. What 
the two had in common, however, was a highly political view of food security, one 
that emphasized control of distribution more than development of agricultural 
production. 
Although they were not necessarily more poorly fed, the Paris population, by 
contrast, saw food as a source of grievance against the authorities. There were, to be 
sure, striking similarities in the food security of the two cities. In Paris as in Beijing, 
policing of grain merchants and bakers was central to the control of the grain trade, 
43Hayashi 1994, 228-33. In commodities other than rice, the authorities followed an 
"Edo-first" policy and encouraged commerce from other areas. "Because it was in the daimyo's 
interest to have rice sell at as high a price as possible, most daimyo governments enacted laws 
that, in effect, gave special protection to the rice dealers .... [and} strictly prohibited the 
importation of rice from outside [their} home domain[s}, except during times of famine" 
(Nakai and McClain 1991, 547). 
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even after the short-lived "liberalization" in 1763-1764. French authorities regarded 
bread as the most vital link in the security of Paris, just as Beijing authorities placed 
great importance on guarding grain supplies (Kaplan 1976, xvi, xxxvi; 1984, 23-
29). Both French and Chinese rulers recognized that wholly taking over the grain 
trade by means of a "leviathan machine" or "master-plan" was both undesirable and 
beyond governmental capacities (Kaplan 1976, I:8-9). But after the building of 
Versailles in the later seventeenth century, Paris was no longer the seat of government. 
It had only about 3,000 police compared to Beijing's 33,000. Paris had no city wall 
after the seventeenth century to control grain movements. Paris authorities did not 
store grain in large quantities, subsidize grain supply, or run soup kitchens (which 
they left to the church). Because of a history of "extensive commercialization before 
state power became concentrated and centralized," the French bourgeoisie had "some 
independent bases of power and some forms of alliance with landlords" (Ikegami and 
Tilly 1994, 454). In Beijing, on the other hand, grain merchants were small in scale, 
did not have a sense of class identity, and did not oppose the state or police in a 
collective way. And in Beijing, unlike Paris, the local population did not seize upon 
hunger or high grain prices as a source of political grievance, regarding neither 
merchant nor official as their foe. They did not think they were the victims of a 
terrible conspiracy. They were in fact the beneficiaries of a complex food security 
system in which long-distance grain tribute was only the most famous of many 
components. 
Reign Periods of the Qing Dynasty ( 1644-1911) 
SZ Shunzhi (1644-1661) 
KX Kangxi (1662-1722) 
YZ Yongzheng (1723-1735) 
Ql Qianlong (1736-1795) 
JQ Jiaqing (1796-1820) 
DG Daoguang (1821-1850) 
XF Xianfeng (1851-1861) 
TZ Tongzhi (1862-1874) 
GX Guangxu (1875-1907) 
XT Xuantong ( 1908-1911) 
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